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The corporation has acquired over time large importance as a method of property tenure and a 
means of organizing economic life.1 Business corporations share the same legal characteristics 
and face the same problems in almost all jurisdictions.2 The five legal characteristics that can 
be found in every corporate law of the world are the following:3 1) legal personality; 2) limited 
liability; 3) free transferability of shares; 4) delegated management; 5) investor ownership. It is 
common that small-and-medium enterprises adopt the corporate form failing to embrace one or 
more of the previously mentioned legal characteristics to fit their particular needs.4 Thus, the 
role of corporate law is to provide business enterprises a legal form that comprises these five 
characteristics to reduce the costs of organizing the business.5  
However, in the early twentieth century, corporation statutes, drafted having in mind the five 
legal characteristics of the corporation, were addressed only to the needs of public corporations, 
and not to close corporations as well.6 Hence, the same rules with almost no exceptions were 
applied to public and close corporations.7 In the United States — as well as in other states — 
courts failed to recognize the differences in the nature and needs between public and close 
corporations.8 In this context, participants in the close corporations found in private agreements 
among themselves a more compatible and flexible method to organize the business according 
to their needs as compared to provisions of corporate law.9 The court decisions on the validity 
of these agreements actually triggered lawmakers to adopt a special corporation statute for close 
companies to better meet their needs. 
The corporate law matter has been influenced and accompanied by the issues of corporate 
governance which have experienced an increase in importance mainly as a result of the global 
financial crisis and corporate scandals.10 The two concepts are interrelated since one of the 
 
1 Berle A., Means G. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: The Macmillan Company, 
p. 3. 
2 Armour J. et al., What Is Corporate Law? In Kraakman R., et al. (2009). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach. 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, p. 1. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2. 
6 Wells H. (2008). The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, Berkeley Business Law 
Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 263-316. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119280. 
7 O’Neal F. H. (1965). Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 50, 
No. 4, pp. 641-662. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr. 
8 Id. at 641. 
9 Wells H., supra note 6, at 263. 
10 Sun W., Stewart J., Pollard D. (2011). Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International 
Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, p. 1. 
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fundamental tasks of the corporate law is to provide a system of governance aimed at mitigating 
the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control characterizing the 
modern corporation.11 In this sense, corporate governance, understood as the set of practices 
within the company that govern the relationships between insiders of the corporation and all 
stakeholders, intends to align the different interests of all participants in the company. 
Therefore, the nature of the corporation will inevitably cause the rise of agency problems which 
have attracted the concerns of academics all over the world. Of course, depending on the 
structure of the company two agency problems are likely to arise.12 First, where the ownership 
structure is widely dispersed — is the case of public companies in the United States — 
managers are not actively monitored by shareholders and, thus, can pursue actions for their 
private benefits that could be detrimental for shareholders. The second agency problem occurs 
in companies with concentrated ownership structures — close companies and public companies 
in Continental Europe — where the majority shareholder controls the company and takes 
actions to expropriate minority shareholders with the aim to gain private benefits.13 In this 
context, the role of corporate governance is to prevent the formation of agency relationships by 
aligning the interests of the different corporate constituents.  
In order to accomplish these objectives, corporate governance comprises a set of both external 
and internal mechanisms shareholders are allowed to adopt to reduce the conflict of interest. 
However, these mechanisms, mainly related to the functioning of corporate boards, have a 
different success rate depending on the company form and where they are used. Of course, 
given the nature and typical features of close corporations, corporate governance mechanisms 
based on board characteristics have not the same effect as in public companies. For this reason, 
close companies’ shareholders regulate their relationship and remand the functioning of the 
company to the use of shareholders’ agreements. 
The purpose of this work is to analyze the use of shareholders’ agreements in closely held 
companies to mitigate agency problems and their regulation in the U.S. and Italian legal 
framework. In the first chapter, an overview of closely held companies is provided. In 
particular, we start by describing the birth of Close Corporation Legislation and its evolution in 
 
11 Romano R. (1996). Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 5, No. 
2, pp. 277-340. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/5.2.277. 
12 Armour J. et al., What Is Corporate Law? In Kraakman R., et al. (2009). The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach. 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, p. 29. 
13 Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 
737-782. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x 
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the United States and Europe. Then, the characteristics of close companies are presented 
compared to the features of partnerships and public companies, along with a description of the 
main problems that are likely to arise in this organizational form. The focus of the second 
chapter is to offer a deep view of the corporate governance concept. Here, we proceed by 
introducing the agency problems that affect the relationships between insiders of the 
corporation. Then, we try to give a definition of corporate governance studying the different 
perspectives used by academics in defining the concept. The corporate governance changes 
depending on the system where is inserted. In this context, we analyze the two common 
corporate governance systems — outsider and insider systems — adopted, respectively, in civil 
and common law countries. For this reason, we describe the corporate governance framework 
in the United States and Italy highlighting similarities and differences. The chapter concludes 
by explaining the corporate governance mechanisms mostly adopted by public companies to 
incentivize directors to pursue the interests of shareholders to the maximization of their wealth.  
In the third chapter, we enter in the main part of the work introducing the concept and 
characteristics of shareholders’ agreements mainly as an instrument used by shareholders in 
close companies to obtain control of the company and maintain the stability in the ownership 
structure of the company. Moreover, we try to identify the reasons for the limited use that 
shareholders’ agreements have in the public listed companies. In the last two chapters, we 
provide a comparative analysis of the regulation of these agreements under the U.S. and Italian 
legal framework, including the disclosure requirements for listed companies and enforcement 













CHAPTER 1: A LOOK TO CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 
 
Summary: Introduction. — 1.1 The Rise of the Close Corporation Legislation. — 1.1.1 The Roots of 
the Close Corporation Law in USA. — 1.1.2 Developments in the European Close Company Law. — 
1.2 The Nature of the Closely Held Company — 1.3 Resemblance of the Close Corporation to the 
Partnership. — 1.4 Close Company compared to Public Company. — 1.5 Problems in Close 
Corporations. — 1.5.1 Minority Shareholder “Oppression”. — 1.5.2 Legal Remedies for Minority 
Shareholders. — 1.5.3 Corporate Deadlock. — 1.6 Chapter conclusions. 
 
Introduction 
Over the last century, the figure of the closely held company in the company law framework 
has received increasing academic and legislative attention. The traditional corporate law was 
founded, since the beginning, upon the needs and the characteristics of the large public 
company. Given their remarkable features, closely held companies are not comfortable with 
this framework. Many rules and formalities designed specifically for public companies and 
imposed upon close counterparties were found to be not applicable. The fundamental difference 
in the ownership and control between publicly held and closely held corporations has implied 
the different evolution of governance mechanisms in the two types of corporate form.14  
Since close companies share some similarities with the partnership form, they were referred to 
as quasi-partnerships. Both organizational forms are formed on the basis of personal 
relationships between the parties who agree to jointly start and conduct the business, sharing 
the benefits and the risks of the business. Moving from this particular resemblance, proponents 
of this theory have supported the application of partnership law provisions to close companies, 
especially including enhanced fiduciary duties typical of partnership relationships for 
shareholders and the right to withdraw their investment from the companies. However, the 
closely held company seemed not to exactly fit in the partnership form, leading to the need to 
develop a corporation law well suited for the close companies. 
Due to unsatisfactory governing mechanisms provided by the traditional company law, 
shareholders tried to organize the company through private agreements among themselves. 
Courts generally voided the private agreements that diverged too far from the statutory norms 
 




of corporation law. The concern of validating or refusing private agreements aimed at designing 
the private ordering of close companies led to the formation of a specific suited law for close 
corporations. 
Before entering into a detailed description of the closely held company, it may be useful to 
provide an insight into the birth and development of close corporation legislation in the United 
States and Europe. 
1.1 The Rise of the Close Corporation Legislation 
Since its inception, corporation law, especially in the United States, has always been 
particularly inflexible, decisively separating the corporation form, whose functioning rules 
were fixed by statute, from the partnership, whose enjoyed more flexibility in terms of limited 
liability and unlimited life.15 Indeed, corporate statutes drafted in the nineteenth century were 
based on the needs of the large public corporations that dominated the economic scene of that 
time.16 In particular, statutes provided for a mandatory corporate structure that fitted perfectly 
with the way public corporations were organized: a Board of Directors vested with the power 
to manage the corporations and shareholders with a limited role in the governance of the 
corporations.17  
However, this structure imposed by statutes was not conceived with the needs of close 
corporations in mind, whose shareholders serves also as managers, and, thus, it created several 
problems for the governance of this type of business organization. Notably, parties in close 
corporations were limited by the statute in the ways they could allocate managerial power 
among themselves.18  
It was probably because in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century courts still viewed with 
skepticism private agreements concluded among shareholders attempting to circumvent the 
board centrality designated by the early corporation law.19 Moreover, the competition for the 
corporate charters that characterized this period contributed to direct the legislative efforts 
towards the public company.20 States started to compete for corporations charters in order to 
 
15 Wells H., supra note 6, at 265. 
16 Id. at 265. 
17 Berle A., Means G., supra note 1. 
18 Karjala D. S. (1989). An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, Arizona State Law 
Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 663-704. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1411450. 




encourage the incorporation of either domestic and foreign corporations, which were required 
to pay incorporation fees and taxes to the state of incorporation.21 In this sense, the foreign 
incorporation of close corporations seemed inconvenient for both the state concerned, which 
would have earned little amount in fees and taxes, being these related to the value of 
corporation’s assets and outstanding shares, and both for the close corporations themselves in 
terms of additional costs and limited advantages of foreign incorporation.22  
Only in the twentieth-century corporation law began to distinguish between large and small 
companies, adopting a series of provisions and, then statutes, to reduce the inflexibility of the 
statutory norms accommodating them to the needs of close corporations. 
1.1.1 The Roots of the Close Corporation Law in USA 
The development of a suited law for close corporations in the US started only from the first half 
of the twentieth century. As we already said, the first attempt could be brought back to the role 
that courts played in ruling the validity or invalidity of the agreements made by participants in 
close corporations.23 The acceptance of the validity of such agreements by the courts led to the 
evolution of a common law of close corporation that deviated from the statutory norms.24 
However, the courts seemed to rule not for the general acceptance of private agreements 
concluded between the participants in close corporations, but instead, they decided the validity 
or not of such agreements from case to case.25 In this sense, courts seemed to operate on a 
discretionary basis validating certain agreements while enforcing the invalidity of others that 
seemed quite similar.26 Furthermore, courts refused to validate certain agreements, even if the 
interests of third parties were not involved and public policy were not at risk.27 
The decision took by the Court of Appels in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel Inc. case led the 
legislature to revise New York’s corporation law in 1948 by introducing the first statute 
specifically confined to the closely-held corporations.28 The statute prescribed the 
 
21 Ayres I. (1992). Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, Washington University Law Review, Vol. 
70, pp. 365-397. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/6. 
22 Id. at 377. 
23Wells H., supra note 6, at 292. 
24 Id. 
25 Israels C. (1948). Close Corporation and the Law, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 33, p.488-506. Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol33/iss4/6. 
26 See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 60 N.E. 829, NY 1945 compared to Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, NY 
1936 in Israels C., supra note 25, at 489-497. 
27 See Jackson v. Hooper 76 NJ Eq. 592, N.J. 1910 in Karjala D., supra note 18, at 672. 
28 N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9, 1948. In Corporations. Voting Requirements. New York Statute Permits Corporations 
to Require Unanimity of Greater than Majority Vote for Director or Shareholder Action, Harvard Law Review, 
1949, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 526-528. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1336551 
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supermajority as a quorum for the decision in the meeting of the board of directors and  
shareholders meeting, as long as the provision was adopted by the unanimous consent of the 
shareholders and appeared in the original certificate of incorporation.29  
Another step in the recognition of a close corporation law was taken in 1955 by North Carolina 
with the adoption of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act.30 The Act rejected the 
“philosophy” according to which co-owners of a close corporation may not maintain a quasi-
partner relationship if they endorsed the corporate form.31 Specifically, the Act expressly 
provided that the agreements concluded between shareholders in corporations whose shares are 
not publicly traded shall not be deemed invalid on the ground that the parties tried to treat the 
corporation as a partnership.32 Nonetheless, the section was simply inserted in the North 
Carolina general incorporation law postponing the drafting of a special statutory regime for 
close corporations.33  
The first separate integrated close corporation statute was issued by the state of Florida in 
1963.34 According to the statute, close corporations, defined as those corporations whose shares 
are not generally traded in the securities market,35 were allowed to decide to adopt the 
provisions of the statute or to be subject to the general corporation law applicable to all 
corporations.36 The statute generally validated agreements between shareholders related to any 
aspect of the corporation’s affairs,37 granted shareholders entitled to appoint a director the 
authority to remove such director with or without cause,38 provided the dissolution in deadlock 
cases.39 Although the provisions contained in the Florida statute resembled those included in 
the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, they seemed not to be well-drafted compared to 
the provisions of the latter.40 The language used in the statute created a sense of uncertainty 
regarding what corporations are subjected by its provisions and the power those corporations 
 
29 Id. 
30 Karjala D., supra note 18, at 669. 
31 Latty E. R. (1956). The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, North 
Carolina Law Review 432, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 432-457. Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol34/iss4/2. 
32 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-73(b), 1955 in Latty E. R., supra note 31, at 438. 
33 Karjala D. S. (1980). A Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, Texas law Review, Vol. 58, No. 
7, pp. 1207-1268. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1411464. 
34 O’Neal F. H. (1972). Close Corporation Legislation: A Survey and an Evaluation, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 21, 
pp. 867-893. Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol21/iss5/4. 
35 Fla. Stat. § 608.70 (2), 1963. 
36 Hodge O’Neal F., supra note 34, at 874. 
37 Fla. Stat. § 608.75(1), 1963. 
38 Fla. Stat. § 608.76. 
39 Fla. Stat. § 608.77. 
40 Hodge O’Neal F., supra note 34, at 879. 
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retain.41 As result, the Florida Statute failed to provide the road for the evolution of close 
corporation legislation.42  
The solution to the problem of close corporation legislation was found in 1967, as the state of 
Delaware and Maryland adopted close corporation statutes.43 In Delaware, the statute was 
drafted as a separate subchapter of the Delaware General Corporation Law and addressed only 
to those corporations that met the definition of the close corporation included in the statute.44 
In particular, a corporation is closed when all its outstanding shares (1) are held by a limited 
number of persons not exceeding thirty; (2) are subject to one or more transfer restrictions; (3) 
are not offered through a public offering.45 The most significant provisions included in the 
subchapter concerned the management of the close corporation; specifically, the statute 
provided that written agreements concluded among the majority shareholders upon the 
restrictions of the power of the board of directors were not deemed invalid,46 and empowered 
shareholders to manage the company’s operation without the board of directors subject to the 
unanimous consent of the former.47  
In a similar way to Delaware, the state of Maryland implemented a series of provisions for close 
corporations.48 According to the Maryland statute, the close corporation denomination is 
granted to the corporation whose charter includes a statement declaring that it is a close 
corporation.49 The declaration of the status of close corporation shall appear upon each 
certificate of the corporation’s shares, and the failure of the charter or any certificate to 
incorporate this declaration does not undermine the close corporation status.50 Unlike Delaware, 
the Maryland Act does not provide for a maximum number of shareholders that a corporation 
must have to maintain its status of close corporation, nonetheless, it precludes the close 
corporation form to those corporations having issued: (1) any securities convertible into stock; 
(2) any voting securities different than stock; (3) any transferable options to subscribe for or 
purchase any of its stock.51 Like Delaware, the Maryland statute allows the direct management 
 
41 Dickson D. (1967). The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment That Failed, University of Miami Law 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 842-853. Available at: https://repository:law.miami.edu/umlr/vol21/iss4/6. 
42 Hodge O’Neal F., supra note 34, at 879. 
43 Id. at 880. 
44 Del. Code Ann. tit.8, § 342, 1968.  
45 Del. Code Ann. tit.8 § 342(a), 1968. 
46 Del. Code Ann. tit.8 § 350, 1968. 
47 Del. Code Ann. tit.8 § 351, 1968. 
48 Wolens J. B. (1968) A Round Peg – A Share Hole: The Close Corporation and the Law, SMU Law Review, Vol. 
22, pp. 811-838. Available at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol22/iss5/7. 
49 Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 100(a), 1967. 
50 Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 100(c). 
51 Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 102(b). 
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of the corporation’s business to the shareholders if provided by the charter,52 and authorizes 
agreements among all shareholders concerning the corporation’s affairs, requiring, differently 
from the Delaware statute, the unanimous consent of the shareholders.53 
Although the issuance of close corporation statutes seemed to represent the solution to the 
problem of a law recognition for the closely-held businesses, their adoption was quite a 
failure.54 Only a relatively small number of corporations filed as statutory close corporations.55 
The reasons behind this failure could be attributed to the lesser need the corporations had of a 
close corporation statute, once the court started to validate shareholders’ agreements and by-
law provisions were no longer uncertain.56 Thus, the corporations began to see the adoption of 
a close corporation statute as a block to its growth.57 
From the 1970s, the corporate form was challenged by a new entity, the limited liability 
company (LLC), introduced by the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act.58 The LLC 
allowed to combine the limited liability protection with the partnership taxation, two usually 
incompatible elements.59 Moreover, the LLC allowed greater organizational flexibility by 
granting all the members the authority to manage the entity, as in the partnership, or to appoint 
a board of directors, as in a corporation.60 As result, by 1995 an LLC statute61 was adopted by 
every state and the number of new businesses adopting these statutes grew consequently 
overcoming the close corporation form, still representing today the preferred business form for 
small companies.62 
 
52 Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 105(a)(1). 
53 Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a). 
54 Wells H., supra note 6, at 314. 
55 O’Neal F. H., Thompson R. (2004). O’Neal and Thompson’s Close Corporation and LLCs: Law and Practice, 
3rd rev. ed., Thomson West editor. [Hereinafter, O’Neal and Thompson] 
56 Wells H., supra note 6, at 314. 
57 Id. 
58 Hamill S. (1998). The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 5, 
pp. 1459-1522. 
59 Hamill S. (1996). The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 95, No. 2, pp. 393-446. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1290118. 
60 Id. at 394. 
61 Wells H., supra note 6, at 315. 
62 Friedman H. (2004). The Silent LLC Revolution – The Social Cost of Academic Neglect, Creighton Law Review, 
Vol. 38, No. 1. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=613022.  
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1.1.2 Developments in the European Close Company Law 
Differently from the United States, where the close corporation form developed through case 
law, almost every state in Europe enacted a specific statute governing the closely held 
companies.63 Germany was the first country to recognize the fundamental distinction between 
the publicly held company, the Atkiengesellschaft (AG), and the closely held company, the 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH), providing a separate legal treatment for 
them.64  The GmbH was formed and governed by the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit 
beschrdnkter Haftung (GmbH Law) of 1892, with the aim to provide a less heavy and expensive 
business entity for the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).65 However, the 
features introduced by the GmbH, including the capital divided by quotas and the opportunity 
to concentrate the managerial power within one person,66 were designed on the capital-oriented 
structure of the publicly held companies.67 
In the United Kingdom, the private company was recognized for the first time only through the 
Companies Act of 1907. This act conferred to companies that fit in the definition of private 
company a series of privileges, including easy terms to form the company,68 reduced disclosure 
requirements,69 and limited liability of the members.70      
The model of GmbH adopted by Germany was followed also by France with the introduction 
of its private company, the société à responsabilité limitée (SARL), by the Act of 1925. Due to 
the simplicity of its operation and the facility in which it may be organized, the SARL was a 
form specifically conceived for the needs of closely held companies.71 In particular, the Act 
 
63 De Vries H., Juenger F. (1964) Limited Liability Contract: The GmbH, Columbia Law Review, 1964, Vol. 64, 
No. 5, pp. 866-886. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1120826. 
64 Scogin Jr. H. (1993) Withdrawal and Expulsion in Germany: A Comparative Perspective on the “Close 
Corporation Problem”, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, pp. 128-188. Available at: 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol15/iss1/3. 
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provided that a minimum of two persons are required to constitute a SARL,72 and its shares 
cannot be subject to a public offering73 or be negotiable.74 
Since the formation of the European Community in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, its efforts 
have been focused on the harmonization of Member State company law. In particular, the 
Treaty provides that the Member States are free to establish branches or subsidiaries in another 
Member State, abolishing restrictions on this freedom,75 unless incompatibilities among the 
company laws of the Member State arises.76 In order to reduce these incompatibilities and 
according to article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, which required that the members adopted equivalent 
safeguards for the protection of its interests and others, the Community adopted a series of 
directives to coordinate the company laws of the diverse Member States.77 The Community 
decided to set target points in the directives toward which the company law of each Member 
State should converge, without formulating a separate Community law.78  
Analyzing the harmonization of company laws of the Member States on the close corporations, 
an important directive was represented by the Twelfth Council Directive of December 1989 on 
Single-Member Private Limited Liability Companies.79 The Directive created a legal 
instrument permitting the limitation of liability of the sole entrepreneur throughout the 
European Community.80 In this sense, the closely held company does not lose the limited 
liability if the company is formed by a single shareholder, either upon formation or after the 
formation.81 
However, the body of directives brought in the European Community landscape a set of 
cumbersome and costly harmonized rules that seemed to be inefficient for closely-held 
companies specifically.82 If it is true, that the mandatory rules convey the impression to be 
beneficial for public companies in reducing the complexity and administrative costs, at the same 
 
72 Law of 7 March 1925 art. 5, 1925, Code de Commerce 85 in Becker L., supra note 71, at 879. 
73 Law of 7 March 1925 art. 22, 1925, Code de Commerce 85. 
74 Law of 7 March 1925 art. 21, 1925, Code de Commerce 85. 
75 European Union, Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome Treaty, 25 March 1957, art.52. 
76 Donald D. (1991). Company Law in the European Community: Toward Supranational Incorporation, Penn State 
International Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-51. Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol9/iss1/2. 
77 Id. at 4. 
78 Id. at 5. 
79 Id. at 6. 
80 Council of the European Union, Twelfth Council Directive of 21 December 1989 on Single-Member, Private 
Limited Liability Companies, Office Journal of the European Communities, 30 December 1989, L 395, Vol. 32, 
at 40. 
81 Id. art. 2, at 41. 
82 McCahery J., Vermeulen E. (2001). Regulatory Competition and the Evolution of Closely Held Business Forms 
in Europe, Tilburg University, at 2. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=292766. 
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time they have the effect to create higher costs for the closed corporation.83 In particular, the 
European Community company law requirements — such as the prescription of a minimum 
capital requirement and disclosure standards — are perceived as over regulatory and unequal 
to the specific features of the closely-held business, causing the latter to incur additional costs.84 
Besides, the harmonization process was hindered by diversity in corporate law norms in the 
diverse member states, and by the unwillingness of them to adopt harmonized rules.85 
In a context in which large publicly held companies continue to hold the most benefits from the 
company law, the efforts of European policymakers of introducing new organizational forms, 
offering cost-saving advantages for entrepreneurs and small firms, have been uneven across 
member states and also produced poor results.86 In particular, following the U.S. and Jersey 
experience, the U.K. turned the tide by introducing the limited liability partnerships (LLPs) 
form by the Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2000.87 This form, thought to provide 
economic benefits to individual firms, was a blend of partnership and company that resembles 
more the limited liability company (LLC) rather than the U.S. limited liability partnership.88 
On one hand, the LLP recalls the features of the corporate form in terms of operating 
formalities, while on the other hand, the decision-making rules resemble the partnership 
organizational form.89  
Similarly to the corporate form, the Act provides the legal personality of the entity,90 limited 
liability of the members, and requires that the LLP has to be registered at Company House to 
be legitimately formed.91 On the organizational side, likewise partnerships, the Act granted LLP 
flexibility in deciding who represents the partnership, how profits are distributed, and who takes 
decisions.92 Furthermore, the LLP is subject to partnership taxation, according to which only 
the members are subject to taxation, not the partnership itself.93 Even if the LLP was constituted 
to provide economic benefits to small and medium-sized enterprises, the company law 
requirements — in terms of filing, accounting, disclosure, and filing — increased the 
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4, pp. 767-802. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25622245. 
88 Id. at 784. 
89 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 82, at 38. 
90 Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000, ch. 12, s. 1. Available at: 
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91 Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000, ch. 12 ss. 2, 3. 
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complexity and the transaction costs of the LLP, making this organizational form economically 
inaccessible for most SMEs.94 
Another effort in introducing a new organizational structure, carrying cost advantages for the 
closely held business form, has been made by the French lawmakers with the establishment of 
société par actions simplifiée (SAS) in 1994.95 The SAS is a legal entity that provides partners 
greater flexibility in the organization and control of the entity, allowing them to decide the 
decision-making structure of the firm and the content of the bylaws.96 Nonetheless, the SAS is 
still subject to the mandatory provisions in the French civil code that apply to the companies, 
excepting for those provisions relating to the management boards and shareholders’ meetings.97 
The extension of the corporate law provisions to the SAS generates additional costs and 
enhances the complexity for this type of entity.98 Even if the management engages in drafting 
the bylaws, to adapt the general corporation framework to the needs of the closely-held 
business, the costs incurred— including transaction costs, information asymmetries, and 
strategic behavior— may deter them to adopt the SAS organizational form.99 
Despite the attempts of national lawmakers to create organizational forms specifically suited to 
meet the needs of close corporations, the European Community lawmakers have always been 
too focused on enacting provisions for the harmonization of public company law, spending poor 
efforts in adopting the same provisions for the closely-held companies.100 At the same time, the 
Commission has believed that the corporate requirements conceived having the public 
companies’ needs in mind were not appropriate for SMEs, which instead require less 
burdensome and simpler conditions for doing business across the European Union.101 For this 
reason, following the introduction of the European Public Company (SE) in 2001, the European 
Commission adopted the European Private Company (SPE) regulated by the Proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Private Company of 2008.102 According to 
what the Explanatory Memorandum attached to the Proposal states, the SPE is an organizational 
 
94 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 82, at 39, and Siems M. supra note 87, at 785 (explain how the LLP 
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95 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 67, at 36. 
96 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 82, at 41. 
97 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 67, at 36. 
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99 McCahery J., Vermeulen E., supra note 82, at 43. 
100 Id. at 45. 
101 European Commission, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A Modern Legal 
Framework for more Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM (2012) 740 final, Strasbourg 12 
December 2012, p. 13. 
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form designated for the SMEs to enhance their cross-border operations in the Single Market by 
providing entrepreneurs the same, and flexible provisions across the Member States.103 In this 
sense, SMEs are allowed to adopt the SPE form in establishing a subsidiary in another 
jurisdiction, reducing the costs that otherwise would be problematic considering their limited 
financial resources.104  
 
The efforts in the introduction of a business entity aimed at facilitating cross-board activities 
can be explained by the low number of SMEs engaging in these activities. In fact, in 2008, 
although SMEs accounted for 99% of companies in the European Union, only 8% engaged in 
cross-board trade, and 5% established subsidiaries or joint ventures abroad.105 Thus, the 
European Community through the adoption of the SPE sought to ensure greater inclusion of 
SMEs in the Single Market to strengthen their growth.106 Given the flexibility required by the 
small and medium-sized enterprises, the Commission’s proposal established simpler 
requirements for the formation of an SPE.107 In particular, the minimum capital required is only 
€1,108 and its registered office and the central administration can be located in two different 
Member States.109 Moreover, greater flexibility is granted to SPE’s shareholders in determining 
the internal organization of the company.110 In the articles of association of the SPE, the 
founders may decide to opt for a one-tier or two-tier management structure, in which the 
administrative board— in the first case— or the management board — in the second case — is 
responsible for the management of the entity.111 The articles may establish the majority required 
to pass shareholders’ resolution, but for specified matters is required a qualified majority not 
less than two-thirds of the total voting rights.112 However, the implementation of the SPE 
regulation was blocked during the Hungarian Council Presidency of 2011, in which the Member 
States did not agree on a draft regulation of the SPE, especially regarding co-determination and 
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taxes issues moved forward by the German exponents.113 As result, the Proposal was 
definitively dismissed by the European Commission in 2014. 
 
Since a unified legal form was still viewed with positivity by the Member States, in 2014 the 
Commission put forward another proposal for a single-member private limited company, the 
Societas Unius Personae (SUP). Different from the Proposal on SPE, the rules governing the 
SUP were established by a Directive rather than a Regulation, showing the intention to aim for 
a harmonization rather than standardization.114 As in the SPE, the minimum capital required to 
set up a SUP was €1, but of particular relevance was the provisions allowing the company to 
be formed online. The governance was also simplified with the restriction prohibiting the 
company to be formed with more than one member.115 Although the Proposal was aimed to 
solve the major issues of the previous proposal, the SUP Proposal was finally withdrawn in 
2017 by the PANA Committee, due to the possibility of using the online formation to create 
“letterbox companies” to evade taxes.  
 
Despite the ongoing efforts of the European Community, the process of creating a new entity 
available throughout the Community designed to meet the needs of SMEs has experienced a 
failure. The reluctance of some states to adopt regulations at a supranational level may be 
explained by their intention to maintain the authority upon the provisions and regulation of 
which incorporated form available to new SMEs are subject. Finally, the introduction of a 
European private company may be pursued, only if the European Community is able to create 
a market demand for this supranational company form.  
1.2 The Nature of the Closely Held Company 
Despite the term “close corporation” is widely used in almost every jurisdiction, a common 
statutory definition of the close corporation has not been established. In this sense, Kessler 
properly compared the close corporation to a “spiral staircase, hard to describe but recognizable 
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when you see one”.116 Even if a precise definition is not available, it is more functional to exhibit 
the characteristic features that distinguish the close corporation all around the world.117 
Consistently to the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the iconic case 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,118 the close corporation is characterized by (a) a small 
number of shareholders, (b) active shareholders participation in the management (c) no ready 
market for corporate shares, (d) share transfer restrictions.  
Thus, firstly, the close corporation is owned by few shareholders, often family members, who 
—differently from shareholders in public companies — have invested all or most of their wealth 
in the company. Secondly, ownership and control in close corporations are not definitively 
separated as in the public companies. Shareholders take substantial participation in the 
management of the company, serving also as managers and incurring in directors’ liabilities. 
Thirdly, shareholders cannot offer shares in the public market, impeding shareholders to cash 
out their investment anytime to employ it in other business opportunities. Lastly, shares are 
subject to transfer restrictions provisions included in the articles of association or shareholders’ 
agreements. These restrictions allow shareholders to determine, according to their preferences, 
by whom the shareholders’ group is formed.119 
In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, it is possible to identify other distinguishable 
features of closed companies.120 First, relationships among corporation’s members are 
characterized by greater flexibility and considerable party autonomy, to the extent that the 
primary source of close companies organization is not found in statutory law, but rather in the 
articles of association. Second, the majority position is relatively stable over time, thus, giving 
poor opportunities to minority shareholders to obtain a majority stake even after the death or 
retirement of one of the majority shareholders. Third, the lack of a secondary market where to 
sell the shares makes the valuation of close companies complicated and not accurate since the 
absence of reliable mechanisms for establishing the value of shares. 
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119 Fleischer H., supra note 117, at 321. 
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1.3 Resemblance of the Close Corporation to the Partnership 
Bearing in mind the characteristics discussed before, close corporations are similar to 
partnerships. Both organizational forms tend to have few owners who often participate in the 
management, and whose ownership positions transferability is usually restricted and lacks an 
active market.121 As specified by Israel, some shareholders in close corporations consider 
themselves partners seeking to conduct their business in the manner of a partnership.122  
In the light of this resemblance, when courts found themselves dealing with issues not covered 
by the close corporation law, they often applied the partnership law principles to close 
corporations. Particularly relevant is the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
in the Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. case concerning the fiduciary duties owed by 
shareholders in close corporations. The court held that since the “fundamental resemblance of 
the close corporation to the partnership…stockholders in the close corporation owe one another 
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one 
another…”123 Hence, the court analyzed the issue under the partnership law rather than the 
corporate law, applying the higher partnership fiduciary duties.124 The Massachusetts court 
followed the majority rule, according to which all shareholders in close corporations —since 
they are viewed as partners— owe an enhanced fiduciary duty to each other.125 This approach 
is opposed to the minority rule, according to which corporate fiduciary duties are applied in the 
relationship between shareholders.126  
The proponents of the partnership analogy argue that the fundamental principles of partnership 
law should apply also to the law of close corporations. Although the analogy may be beneficial, 
it presents some drawbacks and can be questionable. Assuming that, participants in close 
companies incorporate only to benefit from the favorable tax treatment or limited liabilities 
while they still want to be treated as partners, is wrong and ignores the knowledge of the 
participants in distinguishing the differences between the corporate and the partnership law.127  
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1.4 Close Company compared to Public Company 
Although close and public companies share the corporation form, the fundamental 
characteristics of the two organizational forms differ sharply. The public corporation or publicly 
held company is commonly defined as the entity whose shares are freely transferable in an 
active securities market. By definition, shareholders in public companies may realize their 
investment at any time by selling their stock positions in a public market according to the Wall 
Street rule. Conversely, no active market is accessible by close corporations’ shareholders, 
whose shares are subject to transfer restrictions. 
Moreover, differently from close corporations, in which shareholders are few and take an active 
role in the management of the company, public corporations are characterized —at least in 
principle— by the separation of ownership and control.128 In public companies, shareholders 
are passive investors who take no part in the labor or the management of the corporation, but 
rather delegate the control of the corporate activities to the management board.129 They solely 
invest money in the company to receive a return on their investment through dividend payments 
or the sale of their shares at an appreciated price.130 On the contrary, close corporations’ 
shareholders usually participate actively in the company with a significant role in the 
management or as employees.131 They normally receive the return on their investment in the 
form of employee compensation and dividend distribution, rather than through the sale of shares 
at an appreciated value in a public market.132 
 
Given their position in the company, close corporation shareholders are usually family members 
or, at least, are involved in a relationship that requires a high level of trust; hence, the restrictions 
on the transfer of shares may be justified by the aim to maintain the continuity of people they 
work with.133 In contrast, in public companies the ownership is usually dispersed among 
thousands of shareholders who rarely work as employees; thus, no restrictions on the transfer 
of shares could be justified in public companies, where the transferability is the rule.134 
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Also, the stable majority position that characterizes the close company is not present in the 
context of public listed companies, where changes in the ownership structure are not so 
uncommon and anybody is potentially a majority or a minority shareholder.135 
 
In the case of abusive conduct by the board of directors or the majority shareholder, in public 
companies, an “oppressed” shareholder may escape these abuses by simply selling their shares 
on a securities market. However, this is not the case for the close corporation shareholder. The 
presence of restrictions on the transfer of the shares and the lack of an active market to sell 
them, lock up shareholders in close corporations, exposing the minority shareholder to the 
opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholder.  
 
Hence, considering the particular features described above, close corporations are affected by 
several problems. These problems, mostly related to management and control, put the company 
in a vulnerable position, especially the minority shareholder who, subject to the effect of the 
majority rule, could be expropriated from the company decision-making process and, 
consequently, lose its control over its investment without the possibility to freely liquidate its 
position and leave the company.136 
1.5 Problems in Close Corporations 
As discussed above, the problems close corporations must face in this normal conduct of 
business are mainly related to its nature. In particular, the absence of a public market for 
corporate shares and the traditional corporate law norms applied to a such flexible 
organizational form creates serious problems for the whole company and the minority 
shareholder more specifically. The most common and perhaps the most cumbersome problems 
represented by the minority shareholder oppression and the so-called “corporate deadlock” will 
be discussed below. 
1.5.1 Minority Shareholder “Oppression” 
According to what has been said, shareholders in close corporations are granted no exit rights, 
which have the effects of locking-up their investment into the company without allowing the 
liquidation of their position in a public market. The presence of a securities market in which 
 
135 Perakis E. (2002). Rights of Minority Shareholders: XVIth Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law, Brisbane 2002, p. 20. 
136 Id.  
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shares can be sold protects investors in public companies from the behavior of those who 
control the entity.  
However, in close corporations where no ready market in which shareholders may sell their 
shares is present, the capital provided by minority shareholders is “seized” and used as majority 
shareholders see fit.137 Even if the minority shareholder could identify potential investors, the 
minority ownership position which carries insufficient voting rights to control the operations of 
the company, especially in companies with a track record of majority oppression, is unlikely to 
generate interests in outside investors.138 Moreover, in close companies, minority shareholders 
have no right to demand a buyout or a dissolution to liquidate their ownership position.139 
Besides, the majority shareholder may use its power to conclude unbalanced transactions with 
the company, dismiss minority shareholders, grant himself inflated directors’ salaries, and 
restrict the distribution of dividends, leaving minority shareholders only with the option to sell 
their shares to the majority shareholder at a discount price.140 Consequently, minority 
shareholders are in a vulnerable position subject to the “oppression” of the controlling group.  
The vulnerable position of minority shareholders is marked under the majority rule that 
characterized the corporate form. This rule requires a simple majority to adopt meeting 
resolutions, and thus, any shareholder holding the majority stake can make all ordinary 
resolutions.141 Following the majority rule, the majority shareholder has the right to appoint the 
majority of the Board of Directors members, who keeps control over the decision of the 
company.142 Since the directors respond to the wishes of shareholders who elected them, the 
majority shareholder effectively controls the board and has the power to make decisions that 
could be harmful to the minority shareholder’s interests.143  
These decisions known as “freeze-out” or “squeeze-out” techniques have the effect to restrict 
the financial and participatory rights of the minority shareholders.144 The most common 
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techniques — often used in combination — encompass the refusal to declare dividends, the 
termination of the minority shareholder’s employment, the removal of the minority shareholder 
from the Board of Directors, the refusal of access to information, and the majority shareholder 
subtraction of corporate earnings.145 Besides, the majority shareholder is likely to enter into 
unbalanced transactions — “sweetheart deal” — with the company itself, for example, by 
purchasing company’s property at a price far below the market value, obtaining interest-free 
loans from the company, leasing office space to the company at an inflated rent, and so on.146 
Company buyback of shares from the majority shareholder falls within the set of sweetheart 
deals when the purchase price is above the intrinsic value of the shares, thus, resulting in a 
breach of duty towards minority shareholders to whom the same opportunity was not granted.147 
Another factor, which contributes to the advancement of minority shareholder oppression, is 
the absence of advance planning for “preventing contracts” between shareholders, aimed at 
anticipating possible events that would cause an oppression situation.148 Through the use of 
preventing contracts, shareholders may regulate numerous aspects concerning their 
relationship, such as how salaries will be determined, the allocation of power for the minority 
within the Board, and mechanisms to resolve disputes among them.149 However, the planning 
activity is not easy for the parties, especially for this type of contract concerning a long-term 
relationship. The first reason can be that contracts are incomplete by their nature. It is 
impossible and costly for the parties to anticipate and regulate all the possible future 
contingencies that may occur in a long-term relationship. The second reason can be explained 
by the ignorance of shareholders in close corporations in legal matters, such as the need for 
contractual protection in this specific case.150 Furthermore, the ignorance of minority 
shareholders of other factors — such as, the potential shareholder conflicts, the applicable legal 
rules, and the effects of majority control — or their overtrust in the good faith of the majority 
shareholders are reasons that prevent the formation of protective contracts.151  
Apart from statutory legal protections, including qualified statutory majority requirements for 
specific matters for resolution as amendments of the articles of association, minority 
shareholders may rely on self-protection mechanisms to protect themselves from the 
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opportunistic behavior of the majority shareholder.152 Minority shareholders can include a veto 
right in the articles of association for specific resolutions, setting apart the majority rule, or by 
the means of shareholders’ voting agreements, they may regulate how the voting rights should 
be cast in the general meeting.153  
 
In the European Community, many rules are adopted to protect minority shareholders, including 
reinforced majorities for specific fundamental matters, double majorities for decisions affecting 
special classes of shares, anti-dilution mechanisms in case of a capital increase, sterilization of 
voting rights attached to treasury shares, and so forth.154 For instance, art. 44 of Directive 
2012/30/EU provides that a reinforced majority of at least two-thirds of the votes attached to 
shares is required for taking decisions of the general meeting concerning a capital reduction or 
a capital increase.155 
Notwithstanding that some courts impose a fiduciary duty between shareholders of a close 
corporation, freeze-out techniques are generally considered legal and acceptable. This is 
possible since the internal corporate decisions involving the main shareholders’ oppression 
issues, such as management, dividend, and employment matters are protected under the 
business judgment rule.156 Consequently, fiduciary duty principles provide inadequate 
protection for the oppressed minority shareholder. 
1.5.2 Legal Remedies for Minority Shareholders 
Minority shareholders are left with different legal remedies to protect their position in situations 
when the resolution taken in the shareholders’ meeting violates the law or the articles of 
association.157  
First, minority shareholders are granted the right to file an action challenging the validity of 
shareholders’ resolutions. The claims for compensation of minority shareholders may be 
required through direct action or derivative action, and their regulation depends on the 
jurisdiction. Direct actions refer to a breach of rights suffered directly from the shareholder who 
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brings a personal action for compensation. For example, the UK legislator allows a shareholder 
whose rights have been violated by the company to enforce them by bringing a direct action.158 
On the other hand, shareholders may pursue these claims through a derivative action in which 
the corporation itself is the party directly involved and shareholders simply suing on the 
corporation’s behalf receiving the compensation in an indirect way.159 For example, in Italy, 
art. 2476-ter c.c. provides that any shareholder can file an action against the company’s 
director.160 In the United States, some jurisdictions allow the file of direct actions for all cases 
of breach of fiduciary duties that harm minority shareholders, while other jurisdictions do not 
differentiate between direct and derivate actions.161 
Second, shareholders are granted the right of exit from the corporation for a good cause in 
specific circumstances. For example, in Italy, art. 2473 c.c. provides that the articles of 
association determine when a shareholder may withdraw from the company and establish the 
relative procedures.162 In any case, shareholders, who have not agreed to the resolution adopted 
to change the purpose or legal form, to merge or split-up the company, to revoke the liquidation 
status, to transfer the company’s seat abroad, to eliminate one or more exit grounds, are entitled 
to exit the company. Moreover, the article provides that, if the corporation is created for an 
indefinite period, a shareholder may exercise its exit right at any moment with a notice of 180 
days unless the articles of association provide for a longer period, but not longer than 1 year. 
Within 180 days also the repayment of the holding shall take place at their market value at the 
time of the exit statement. 
Third, most jurisdictions allow shareholders to require access to the books and records of the 
company for inspection purposes. However, shareholders requiring the inspection must prove 
the existence of a reasonable purpose for the request, such as to find wrongdoing, to assist 
shareholder litigation, to help in the valuation of the shares, and so forth.163 
Finally, shareholders can protect themselves through extrajudicial remedies that are increasing 
their importance in the close companies. Arbitration and mediation clauses are common to find 
in the articles of association of close companies as a means of dispute resolution.164 In 
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particular, mediation clauses are more useful in this type of company since they permit to value 
disputes from case to case, analyzing the intertwined relationships characterizing close 
companies.165 
 
1.5.3 Corporate Deadlock 
Conflicts in close corporations may arise for reasons other than the oppression of minority 
shareholders caused by the opportunistic behavior of the majority shareholder.166 These 
conflicts are likely to arise in deadlock situations. Generally, a company is in a deadlock 
situation when its decisional process is in a stalemate.167 Thus, it means that an internal conflict 
between shareholders and directors prevent them from properly operating the company, causing 
the latter to be paralyzed. The deadlock usually occurs in two situations that typically arise in 
close companies.168 The first situation arises when the members of the board of directors and/or 
the shareholders are equally divided on a management affair and are unable to take proper 
management actions.169 The second situation occurs when a majority in the board of directors 
controls the management of the corporation, and shareholders, equally divided, are unable to 
appoint a new board of directors, allowing the current majority to control the corporate 
management indefinitely.170  
Additionally, a deadlock may occur even in the case in which shareholders holding the same 
ownership stake refuse to join together and form a majority, or a veto right is granted to the 
minority shareholder to protect him/her from the oppressive conduct of the majority.171 Simply, 
a deadlock occurs whenever a participant has the power to freeze the other participants to pursue 
corporate activities.172 
Due to its particular features, the close corporation is particularly vulnerable to deadlock 
situations. Typically, close corporations are owned by few investors who also take a 
management position, and who invest all or most of their wealth in the company. Since no 
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public market is available, dissenting shareholders cannot freely sell their shares and leave the 
company. Moreover, most shareholders in close corporations are family members or close 
friends, who have a personal relationship with each other. These personal ties may increase the 
possibility that conflicts and misunderstandings occur, causing the company gridlock and even 
its demise.173 Despite courts provided the dissolution of the company or the buy-out of the 
shares of the dissenting shareholder as remedies for deadlock situations, close corporation 
shareholders are reluctant to consider these remedies acceptable.174 Since they spent 
considerable money and energy in creating the success of the enterprise, they have no personal 
interest to dissolve the company or leave it through a buy-out agreement.175 For this reason, 
third party remedies are surely more desired by parties who want to preserve the ongoing nature 
of the company. These remedies involve the intervention of a neutral third party who can be 
distinguished in: (a) a “custodian” or “temporary receiver”, that maintains the operation of the 
company until an agreement between the parties has been reached; (b) an arbitrator, who 
resolves the dispute among the shareholders by making a binding decision after having 
considered the claims of both parties; (c) a mediator, who facilitates the communication and 
negotiation between the parties to find a mutually acceptable solution; (d) a provisional director, 
who is vested with the power to vote at boards meetings to break deadlocks, and, at the same 
time, acts as a mediator to find alternative ways to solve the issues.176 
However, the use of a third party completely external to the company, especially in the case of 
a provisional director, raised the concern to what extent the courts may interfere and be involved 
with the internal business affairs of the company.177 Even if, by definition, courts should not 
interfere in the corporation affairs, leaving shareholders with the freedom to take actions under 
the authority vested in them, the same deadlock situation may be so harmful to affect the other 
corporate parties to justify a court intervention to resolve the situation.178  The best solution 
could be to balance the autonomy of shareholders, whose interests should be primary, with 
courts intervention keeping it at the minimum that the safeguard of public policy requires.179 
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1.6 Chapter conclusions 
The present chapter has identified an overview of the developments that occurred in the 
European and United States Company Law with regards to the Close Corporation legislation 
and the consequent definition and recognition of the close company form. A description of the 
features of the closely held company has been provided, along with the similarities shared with 
the partnership form without neglecting the differences between the two business forms and the 
doubts of scholars and academics in accepting the resemblance theory. The chapter continues 
by comparing the closely held company with the publicly held company to which most of the 
efforts of early legislators have been addressed. Of particular interest is the description of the 
different roles shareholders have in close and public companies. While in public companies 
they are passive investors who simply invest their money to receive a return on investment, in 
close companies, shareholders are not focused just on the economic part, but rather they invest 
money and claim an active role in the management of the company. Obviously, minority 
shareholders are more exposed to majority oppression in the close companies where no market 
for shares is available. 
Therefore, the chapter concludes with a representation of the major problems close companies 
are subject to and the attempt of legislators to provide mechanisms to reduce them. In particular, 
it has been described the major risks mainly investors holding the minority stake in the business 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance refers to the systems or rules, relationships, and processes within a 
company aimed at guaranteeing the proper and efficient management of the company. 
Corporate governance examines the structure of rights and responsibilities of stakeholders 
within the company and stakeholders with vested interests in the firm, such as customers, 
suppliers, community, government.  
This chapter is introduced with an understanding of agency problems that arise from the typical 
relationship between shareholders and managers and within the shareholders themselves. The 
agency problem occurs whenever the interests of a principal and an agent are not aligned and 
come into a conflict. The agency problem arises in both public and close companies with a 
different connotation. While in public companies the agent, represented by the manager, is 
likely to pursue its interests to the detriment of the principal or shareholders, in close companies 
the agent is constituted by the majority shareholder who takes actions that mostly have the 
effect to expropriate the principal, in this case, the minority shareholder. In this context, 
corporate governance can be used to modify the rules under which the agent behaves, steering 
it towards the maximization of the principal interest. 
After looking at the different definitions that academics and agencies provided, the chapter 
describes the different corporate governance mechanisms related to the ownership structure that 
characterized the different countries. The chapter continues with an analysis of the corporate 
governance framework of the countries under study, namely the U.S. and Italy and it concludes 
with a description of the internal corporate governance mechanisms used to solve the agency 
problem and reduce the information asymmetries between the parties. 
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2.1 The Agency Problem 
The Agency Theory stems from the difficulties arising from the typical agency relationship that 
characterizes the modern corporation. An agency relationship is a contract in which one party 
(the principal) delegates another person (the agent) to perform certain activities on its behalf.180 
Thus, the agent is supposed to act to maximize the interest of the principal. However, often the 
principal and the agent have both different interests which do not converge at the same point, 
and thus, the agent is moved by its interest to act to maximize its welfare.181  This divergence 
of interests represents the origin of agency problems. The agency problem occurs whenever the 
agent acts in its interest to the detriment of the principal’s interest. The resulting conflict of 
interests between the principal and the agent may lead to costly inefficiencies harming the 
welfare of the former. The authority delegated by the principal to the agent puts the latter in a 
favorable condition to act opportunistically towards the principal and the company itself. On its 
side, the principal needs to adopt control and incentive mechanisms trying to align the interests 
of the agent with its own. 
The most common agency relationship in modern corporations is the shareholder-manager 
relationship. The manager (the agent) is appointed by the shareholder (the principal) to oversee 
the management of the company, of which the latter is the residual claimant bearing all the risk 
associated with the incorrect functioning of this type of relationship. In this context, the agency 
problem derives from the phenomenon of separation of ownership and control that distinguishes 
the modern corporation.182 The shareholder provides the capital to the firm and delegates the 
control to the managers who employ the capital in the business activities.183 Information 
asymmetries between the two parties necessarily arise, since managers are more informed on 
how to allocate capital provided by the shareholder. While shareholders are focused on raising 
the stock price and on high dividends, on the other hand, managers may be focused on 
increasing the profits or, at the opposite, they may be lazy or fraudulent.184 These conflictual 
objectives of the counterparties may lead managers to make investment decisions not optimal 
for the welfare of the shareholders, leading to the rise of agency problems. 
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However, the separation of ownership and control is not present in close companies in which 
the shareholders and the manager are often the same person. Also, in Continental Europe just 
in few listed companies, the ownership structure is dispersed as in the U.S. In most listed 
companies the ownership structure is typically concentrated, with one shareholder or a family 
holding the majority of votes.185 In these companies, another agency problem between the 
majority and minority shareholders is likely to arise. The majority shareholders effectively 
exercise control over the company that allows them to take actions aimed at seizing the extra 
benefits of the company.186 As we already discussed, these actions might be detrimental to the 
minority shareholders. However, minority shareholders may rely on various mechanisms to 
protect their rights and interests.187 
The third agency problem lies in the relationship between the corporation (the agent) itself and 
the other stakeholders (the principal) — customers, creditors, employees — with whom the 
company contracts with.188 The risk associated with this agency problem is the possibility that 
the company behaves opportunistically towards the stakeholders — for example by misleading 
customers, expropriating creditors, or exploiting workers.189 This problem is strictly related to 
the stakeholder theory, according to which the company directors have the duty to balance and 
maximize the interest of every party involved in the company’s business. 
In this context, the role of corporate governance is to balance the information asymmetries and 
mitigate the agency conflicts arising within the company, aligning the interests of the agent and 
the principal.190  
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2.2 Definition of Corporate Governance  
The term corporate governance has been the subject of numerous studies in the political and 
scientific context of the major industrial countries.191 The financial and accounting scandals of 
the last years have brought the need to revise the corporate governance practices to offer 
investors stronger safeguards and increasing obligations and requirements to which directors 
should comply.192 Although the term corporate governance has been used for many years, no 
common definition was developed, and those provided by different scholars and authors differ 
from each other and are usually ambiguous. Basically, the concept of corporate governance was 
studied from different perspectives. 
Coda defines the corporate governance system as the set of functioning characters of the 
governance and control bodies in the relationship between them and with the representatives of 
the property and with the managerial structure.193 On the other hand, Kose and Senbet take an 
external perspective stating that “the corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which 
stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such 
that their interests are protected”.194 This definition supports the argument that the company 
has obligations not only towards its shareholders but, at the same way, to all stakeholders, 
whose involvement is fundamental for the success of the firm.195 
Shleifer and Vishny consider the economic interests of the corporate participants in defining 
corporate governance as the system that “deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments”.196 Similarly, Rajan 
and Zingales define corporate governance in a finance perspective as “the complex set of 
constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rent generated by a firm”.197 
The OECD definition covers all the aspects of the corporate governance framework. It states 
that “corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, 
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its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”.198 In this sense, corporate governance has 
the role to provide the structure through which the corporation objects are set and determine the 
means of achieving those objectives and monitoring performances.199  This structure points out 
the allocation of rights, roles, and responsibilities among the different participants in the 
company — such as shareholders, the board, managers, and the stakeholders — and specifies 
the procedures and rules for making decisions on companies affairs.  
Despite the difficulties in establishing a commonly accepted and adopted standard definition, 
corporate governance can be simply identified in a system of principles and rules that provides 
guidelines for organizing companies internally in a more efficient way, to reduce and manage 
the conflicting interests between the internal participants and the stakeholders. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Systems 
An important role in determining the economic performance of the firm is played by corporate 
governance systems which, through their mechanisms, affect the return on investments of the 
external finance providers of the firm.200 To be efficient a corporate governance system must 
be able to reduce the information asymmetries and ease monitoring for suppliers of finance 
when they provide the capital to be allocated to the corporation.201 Corporate governance 
systems are related to the degree of ownership and control and differ in countries characterized 
by dispersed ownership — outsider systems — and countries characterized by concentrated 
ownership or control — insider systems.202  
The different patterns of ownership and control require different corporate control mechanisms 
and incentives: although concentrated ownership seems to crate long-term relationship between 
the company and its investors, the private benefit the owner may receive could cause costly 
delays in taking the necessary corrective actions; on the other hand, although in a dispersed 
ownership structure the likelihood of taking prematurely corrective actions is probably higher, 
the presence of diversified public owners can be more appropriate for high-risk companies that 
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require a large amount of investment capital.203 Despite both systems have developed from 
different regulatory, institutional, and political environments, they share an internal consistent 
governance system and a unique blend of corporate control.204  
2.3.1 Outsider or Anglo-Saxon Model 
Outsider systems or market systems are typical of common law countries —the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia— characterized by relatively widely dispersed 
ownership and control.205 This model, also known as the Anglo-Saxon model, is founded on 
the notion of market capitalism, according to which the ownership stake and decentralized 
market can operate in a self-controlled and balanced manner.206 Thus, in Anglo-American 
countries (U.S., U.K., Australia, and Canada) corporations have generally similar systems of 
corporate governance. Outsider systems are characterized by the following features: (1) 
dispersed equity ownership with large institutional holdings; (2) primacy of shareholders’ 
interests; (3) broad delegation of management power; (4) strong emphasis on the protection of 
minority shareholders; (5) strict disclosure requirements.207  
 
The dispersed equity ownership feature emphasizes the fact that, in these countries, companies 
rarely have a controlling shareholder. Rather than investing in just one company, shareholders 
prefer to invest in different companies to diversify the risk. Moreover, in these countries, a 
typical phenomenon is the increased ownership stake owned by institutional investors — such 
as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies.208 For example, in the U.S. and U.K., 
the largest institutional investors on average hold more than 30% of the capital stake in public 
listed companies.209 As well as individual investors, institutional investors typically have no 
interest in running the business, rather they work with a well-diversified portfolio of businesses 
in which they invest their money intending to maximize their return on investments.210 Since in 
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this system ownership is widely spread and shareholders are not interested in running the 
company, the power to manage the company is vested in the management board. Shareholders 
have no incentives to monitor the conduct of directors (free-riding problem)211, who have 
relative freedom to run the company as they see fit. However, this does not mean that directors 
are not accountable to the shareholders’ interests. For this reason, outsider systems are coupled 
with a series of external corporate governance mechanisms deemed at reducing the managers’ 
opportunistic behavior.  
The outsider model strongly emphasizes the protection of shareholders’ rights, in particular 
those of the minority shareholders, which is related to an active stock market.212 The absence 
of concentrated ownership and the presence of an active market reduce the need for active 
corporate governance.213 Since unhappy minority shareholders may sell their ownership 
position in the securities market any time they want, intrusive corporate governance 
mechanisms protecting the minority rights are not necessary. These systems also promote a 
more reliable and adequate distribution of information that enables investors to make more 
informed investment decisions.214 An example may be the elaboration of rules that prevent a 
group of shareholders from communicating and sharing information among themselves without 
making the information available to all shareholders.215 
Thus, the model supports the use of public capital markets in influencing the behavior of the 
parties.216 Whenever managers fail to maximize shareholders’ value and share price falls, the 
company is exposed to take-over bids and inefficient managers are at risk to be removed.217 
The public capital market works as a regulatory system that incentives managers to act in the 
interest of shareholders. 
If, on one hand, outsider systems incentive shareholders investments in a diversified portfolio 
and reduce the room for shareholders conflicts thank the high dispersion of capital, on the other 
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side these systems have been criticized for their short-termism in delivering the results to 
shareholders that may be harmful to the success of the company and creates agency problems 
between parties within the company.218 
2.3.2 Insider or Continental Model 
Insider corporate governance systems adopted by Continental European countries — except the 
U.K. — and Japan, are characterized by concentrated ownership and long-term stable 
relationships between participants within the company.219 The majority or almost majority of 
shares are held by a single investor or a group of investors, who effectively exercise control 
over the company. Group of insiders is typically individuals, family members, or banks and 
holding companies.220 The existence of strict ties among insiders facilitate the communication 
among them and promote the jointly and close monitoring of the board activities.221 As well as 
outsider systems the control of the business activities lies in the hands of management, however, 
differently from market systems, in insider systems controlling shareholders and managers 
communicate intensely. Given their large investment in the company, majority shareholders 
have the interest to monitor closely the activity of the management board and have the power 
to influence the election of the management. Thus, they may use their power to force managers 
to direct the business activities towards their interests. 
Conversely to outsider systems that emphasize the primacy of shareholders’ interests, the 
Continental model focuses not only on the interests of shareholders, but also on those of all 
stakeholders — managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and community.222 According to 
this view, stakeholders exercise their right to participate in the corporate decisions through their 
membership in the supervisory board — typical of two-tier systems.223  
In insider systems, the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is weaker than in market 
systems. This is because insider systems are more tolerant of a group of shareholders who act 
jointly to control the management while excluding the minority part.224 
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Differently from outsider systems, the ownership structures of insider systems companies are 
characterized by less presence of institutional investors. The stake of ownership owned by 
pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies is not comparable to those owned in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, where they emerged as the most active and largest class of investors.225 
The Insider model is concentrated on the banking system. Banks seek to create complex and 
long-term relationships with corporate clients.226 Rather than stressing the need for public 
disclosure as in market systems, the banking system interacts with its clients through insider 
communication.227 Given the lack of sophisticated institutional investors and the prominent 
figure of the bank in the financing role, corporations have a narrow range of financial assets 
available compared to corporations in market-based countries.228  
The Continental model has the powerful advantage of reducing the agency costs between 
majority shareholders and managers. Since they invest most of their wealth into the company, 
they have the incentive of monitoring closely the management and influencing it to act in their 
interest. Thus, the intensive communication between the two parties ensures that management 
performs long-term investments, without worrying about stock prices level and threats of a 
takeover. However, on the other hand, the control exercised by controlling shareholders over 
the board gives rise to agency problems between majority and minority shareholders. The 
controlling shareholder may have the incentive to extra private benefits by colluding with the 
management at the expense of minority shareholders.229 For example, Blockholders may force 
the management to divert resources to other companies they completely own, damaging in this 
way the minority shareholders.230  
In insider systems, the focus of corporate governance and regulations is shifted from reducing 
managers’ opportunism directing their effort to shareholder maximization value, to the 
protection of minority shareholders from the interest of the controlling shareholder to extract 
its private benefits to the detriment of those of minority shareholders.231 
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2.3.3 Control-Enhancing Mechanisms 
As stated above, in Continental European listed companies, where the presence of a controlling 
shareholder is common, the most important corporate governance concern is the protection of 
minority shareholders from the controlling shareholder’s actions aimed at extracting its private 
benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. This problem is particularly exacerbated in 
situations where the voting rights of controlling shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights.232 
This gap is likely to affect the relationship between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders in two ways:233 first, it deviates the interests of insiders from the maximization of 
shareholders’ value, and second, it prevents the threat of hostile takeovers due to the presence 
of a controlling stake. The separation of voting rights and cash-flow rights can be reached 
through the use of control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs). 
The most common ad effective CEMs are the issuance of multiple voting rights shares and the 
use of pyramidal ownership structures. Multiple voting rights shares represent a deviation from 
the one-share-one-vote rule, and they involve the allocation of different voting power to the 
owners of different classes of shares.234 On the other hand, the pyramidal ownership structure 
refers to the situation where a controlling shareholder or group directly controls a company, 
which in turn has majority participation in another company, which itself controls a third 
company, and so forth.235 Through the use of pyramidal structure, the large shareholder is able 
to maintain control of even large listed companies situated at the bottom of the structure without 
investing the amount of money that would be necessary to obtain the same amount of voting 
power in the companies.236 
The two CEMs are differently adopted depending on the country concerned. While multiple 
voting rights shares are commonly used in the United States, on the other hand, pyramidal 
structures are widespread in European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
Despite this distinction in countries areas, empirical research indicates that pyramidal structures 
are more common than dual-class shares in absolute terms.237 
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The United States is characterized by a rare presence of pyramidal ownership structures in listed 
companies.238 According to Randal Morck, this is principally due to the introduction of the 
intercompany dividend taxation in 1930, which has rendered pyramidal structures more costly 
for controlling investors.239 In this sense, U.S. listed companies are more likely to use dual-
class shares to separate voting rights from cash-flow rights.240 Gompers et al. found that 6% of 
U.S. listed companies — 8% of market capitalization — have adopted dual-class shares.241 
However, differently from the United States, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy have adopted 
pyramidal structures as a favorite CEM. For instance, in Italy, despite the attempts of the 
legislator to reduce the adoption of pyramidal ownership structures, 12% of listed companies, 
representing 36% of market capitalization, are controlled by pyramidal groups.242 
Even if pyramids structures and multiple voting rights shares involve different mechanisms to 
separate voting rights from cash-flow rights, they both are likely to exacerbate agency 
problems.243 They are negatively perceived by institutional investors who expect a discount on 
the price paid to purchase shares in companies where these mechanisms are present. For 
example, in the United States companies are not allowed to issue multiple voting rights shares 
after the IPO, leading outsider investors to apply a discount on the price paid to purchase the 
shares because of the presence of a sub-optimal ownership structure of the company.244 In the 
same way, although pyramid structures can be adopted even after the IPO, investors can apply 
the discount on the likelihood that the pyramid structure will be used in the next future.245  
2.4 Country-Specific Corporate Governance Framework 
Once having identified and described the main two corporate governance systems and the 
ownership structure that distinguish the corporate entities within both systems, we provide a 
brief analysis of the corporate governance frameworks and ownership structures of the two 
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countries under our study, namely Italy and the U.S. This description is useful to understand 
what the different features of the corporate governance and ownership structure are and how 
these elements affect the methods applied in both countries to prevent the controlling 
shareholder’s extraction of private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
2.4.1 Italian Framework 
The Italian corporate governance system may be classified as Latin Model, although it owns 
particular features that do not fit perfectly into the international standard models.246 This 
system, along with the German Model, belongs to the insider or relationship-based system that 
characterized most European countries and which is opposed to the Anglo-Saxon models 
centered on market rules.247 The Latin system is more flexible than the German system since 
shareholders are free to decide to structure the board of directors in two ways: one board as in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, or two boards like the German model.248 
Generally, as in the Insider model, Italian listed and unlisted companies are owned by few 
shareholders, who are often linked by familiar or friendship ties and are able to exert their 
control over the corporation.249 In fact, according to the report on corporate governance 
published by the CONSOB at the end of 2018 more than half of the Italian listed companies 
(53%) are controlled by a shareholder owning a stake higher than half of the capital, 25% are 
weakly controlled with a stake lower than the 50%, and 10% are owned by a coalition of 
shareholders. Only 5% of listed firms — representing 20.5% of market capitalization — are 
widely held. The presence of institutional investors is not yet diffused (27% of listed 
companies) but is growing with a prevalence of foreign institutional investors upon the Italian 
ones. Within institutional investors, the presence of banks and insurance companies (mostly 
Italian) is declining at the expense of the so-called “active investors” such as private equity, 
venture capital company, and sovereign funds. There is a decline in the adoption of pyramid 
structure and issuance of preferred shares, possibly due to an increase in market pressure.250 
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The Company Law is contained in articles 2060 to 2642 of the Civil Code, which provisions 
regulate all the matters related to business organization, from the forms of business to the role 
and relationship between shareholders, the board of directors, and the board of auditors.251 The 
Consolidated Law on Finance (T.U.F.) provides a legal framework for financial markets. 
Companies may adhere to the Corporate Governance Code, issued by the Corporate 
Governance Committee, which comprehends the principles and suggested practices of 
corporate governance.252 Like in other jurisdictions, in Italy companies may decide to issue 
preferred shares, which are shares with limited voting rights for a value not higher than half of 
the capital. However, probably due to strict legal constraints and insufficient investor 
protection, this instrument has not been so used by investors.253 
Shareholders in Italian close and public companies elect a Board of Directors (BoDs), which 
has the role to govern the business, and a Board of Auditors which, with an audit role, simply 
supervises the conduct of directors. Although in publicly-held corporations the Board of 
Directors retains the exclusive authority to manage — or appoint the management — of the 
company’s business,254 in privately-held companies can be established a rule that vests 
shareholders with the authority to take management role and decisions. All the members of the 
BoDs are elected by the shareholders, with the partial exception that vacancies in the board due 
to resignation or other causes may be temporarily filled by the board members.255 The board is 
elected for a maximum period of three years, and the members shall be eligible for re-election 
unless otherwise provided by statute, and they can be removed at any time, but if the removal 
occurs without cause, dismissed directors are entitled to compensation for damage.256 In listed 
companies, article 147-ter of the Consolidated Law on Finance provides the mandatory 
representation of minority shareholders in the BoDs. The statute provides that the members of 
the BoDs must be elected on the basis of the list of candidates and defines the minimum 
participation share required for their presentation, at an extent not above a fortieth of the share 
capital. The statute also provides that at list one BoDs’ member shall be elected from the 
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minority list that obtained the largest number of votes and is not linked in any way with the 
shareholders who have submitted or voted for the list which came in first by number of votes.257 
As regards the compensation of directors and managers, companies should follow the general 
criteria of corporate governance in designing the compensation plan, with the recommendation 
to adopt long-term incentive mechanisms — like stock option plans — to align the interests of 
the board with those of shareholders. 
 
The Board of Auditors or Supervisory Board (Collegio sindacale) is composed of independent 
auditors entrusted by shareholders with the supervision of the directors.258 This board ensures 
compliance with the law and the Articles of Association, observance of the principles of good 
administration, the adequacy of the organizational, administrative, and accounting structure, 
and its proper functioning.259As provided for the BoDs the mandate of the Board of Auditors is 
a maximum of three years, and the members can be dismissed only for cause.260 Shareholders 
directly appoint the three or five members of the Board of Auditors, of which among them at 
least one member should be an auditor recorded in the proper legal register; in the lack of this 
registration, the other members should be selected among those registered in professional 
registers or among university professors in the law or economic field.261 The condition required 
to be an auditor is independence. Professionals who are linked in any way to shareholders or to 
the company itself, cannot be elected as auditors and are disqualified from the office.262 As in 
the Board of Directors, in listed companies, one member of the Board of Auditors shall be 
elected by the minority shareholders who are not linked with the shareholders who submitted 
or voted the list which came in first by number of votes.263 
For listed companies, the external audit is mandatory and has the aim to periodically audit the 
financial statements and check the accounts and records of the company. The auditing activity 
should be performed by an external legal auditor recorder in the proper register or by an audit 
firm.264 In the limited liability company (s.r.l.), the obligation to appoint an external auditor 
arises only when the company is required to draft consolidated financial statements or controls 
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a company subject to statutory audit, or when it has exceeded for two consecutive financial 
years two of three thresholds specified by the article 2435-bis Civil Code.265 
Therefore, the prevailing ownership structure of Italian corporations is marked by the presence 
of a majority shareholder or “blockholder” who take the control of the company and is able to 
monitor effectively the management actions.266 As we said before if it is true that this structure 
reduces the agency problem between shareholders and managers, on the other hand, it increases 
the possibility that an agency problem between the majority and minority shareholder arises.267 
In this sense, the Italian company law has probably contributed excessively to the certainty of 
control at the expense of shareholders’ protection.268 
2.4.2 The U.S.A. Framework 
As an outsider country, the ownership structure of public companies in the United States is 
usually widely spread among a large number of shareholders. The United States is traditionally 
portrayed as a political economy having most companies with dispersed ownership structures 
and the presence of private and institutional investors, and few listed companies having large 
blockholders. However, since the financial crisis, a powerful ongoing trend is changing the 
ownership structure of listed firms in the US.269 
Empirical evidence has shown that few listed companies can be considered widely held, while 
most companies present multiple blockholders, each owning more than a 5% stake.270 In 
contrast to Italy and European countries in general, United States public companies are 
characterized by high participation of institutional investors in the ownership structure. At the 
end of 2017, institutional investors held around 72% of the United States stock market value, 
of which 61% of these holdings were held by US institutions.271 Moreover, US institutional 
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investors account for significant holdings in foreign markets, holding 22% and 17% in 2017 of 
the public equity in the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively.272 
In the United States, corporate law is regulated at the State level, with each state owning its 
law. However, since the US has allowed regulatory competition, most corporations decide to 
incorporate in Delaware to enjoy the low corporate taxation. Thus, the Delaware Code has 
become the reference point for the United States corporate law. Securities law is regulated by 
the Securities Act of 1993 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The corporate governance 
law is regulated by different legal regimes, including mainly State law and federal statutory 
rules, and by certain rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).273 
Besides, stock exchanges, such as NASDAQ and NYSE impose certain mandatory 
requirements on a company listed in such exchanges that must be disclosed in their annual 
report. Like Italy, United States allows corporations to issue different classes of shares, shares 
with limited or no voting powers, on condition that they are stated in the certificate of 
incorporation or of any amendment thereto, or in the resolution providing for the issue of such 
shares adopted by the BoDs.274 
Like in the other Common Law countries, in the United States the Board of Directors is 
structured according to the one-tier system. Differently from two-tier systems, the management 
and control of the company are performed by one governing body, without the presence of a 
Supervisory Board, whose function is instead performed by a committee formed within the 
Board itself. Directors are elected by shareholders at the annual general meeting for a one-year 
term unless the company adopts a staggered board.275 Under Delaware law, the default rule for 
the election of the board is plurality voting unless companies provide for cumulative voting.276 
The director need not be a shareholder of the corporation unless the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws so prescribe.277 Shareholders may remove directors with or without cause unless the 
articles of incorporation provide that directors can be removed only for cause, or if cumulative 
voting is authorized, the director cannot be removed if the number of votes sufficient to elect 
him under cumulative voting is voted against the removal.278 Any vacancies occurring in the 
BoDs may be filled by shareholders or by the board of directors unless the articles of 
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incorporation provide otherwise.279 The quorum required for board of directors’ resolutions is 
the majority of the votes cast by directors unless the articles of incorporation provide for a 
different quorum that, however, cannot be lower than one-third of the number of directors.280 
Unlike Italian jurisdiction, the United States corporate does not provide for a mandatory 
representation of minority shareholders in listed companies. The United States does not provide 
for obligations concerning directors’ remuneration, giving the board of directors the duty to fix 
the compensation of directors unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide 
otherwise.281 
As in Italy, the law provides for the mandatory audit of the company’s annual financial 
statements by an external audit firm hired by the company’s auditing committee. The external 
auditors are independent professionals who examine the company’s financial statements, 
accounting books, and transaction records and prepare a report containing an opinion on the 
financial statements to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Private companies are not required to have their financial statements audited. Although no 
mandatory audit is provided, some private companies undergo an independent audit to satisfy 
lenders or shareholders. 
In conclusion, the uncommon presence of a blockholder in the ownership structure of US 
companies reduces the likelihood of controlling shareholders measures that expropriate the 
minority shareholders to extract benefits for them. Therefore, especially in a legal framework 
in which controlling shareholders monitoring is not available, the use of incentives like 
performance-related compensations, constitute a helpful tool to align the interests of the 
management body with those of shareholders, thus reducing the likelihood that agency 
problems between the two parties arise. 
2.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
As mentioned above, the organization of the ownership and control in both public and close 
companies give rise to agency problems representing an obstacle to the proper functioning of 
the company. Corporate governance provides a series of mechanisms designed to reduce agency 
costs and solve corporate agency problems aligning shareholders’ and managers’ interests. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into two categories: internal and external 
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mechanisms.282 External mechanisms comprehend market-based techniques that are external to 
the management of the company designed to reinforce the internal governance structure of the 
company.283 On the other hand, internal mechanisms derive from the nexus of contracts among 
participants in the company.284  
Undoubtedly close companies adopt different external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. From their choice of the organizational forms to adopt, they implicitly define and 
determine the internal corporate governance mechanisms. For example, in certain cases, the 
chosen business form allows companies for a corporate governance structure in which the 
owners take control of the firm without the board, or shareholders may opt for a company of a 
certain size to benefit from the two-tiered system.285 The internal mechanisms, like the 
ownership, also depend on the source of finance close companies obtain. Companies associated 
with high risk are rarely able to obtain funding from the banks, but at the same time, they attract 
private equity investors who usually take a management role in the company and, more in 
general, implement respect, integrity, transparency, and confidentiality within the company.286  
The building of trust and an enhanced reputation for private equity investors is an example of 
an effective external corporate governance mechanism employed by close companies. On the 
other hand, the market for corporate control is an effective corporate governance external 
mechanism for publicly held companies. The threat of hostile takeover incentives the 
management to forego actions aimed at increasing their wealth that could be detrimental for the 
company.287 
The internal mechanisms are constituted by the board of directors and audit committee and their 
characteristics, such as board size, board composition, board diversity, and audit committee’s 
independence.288 Thus, adopting better corporate governance internal practices, such as an 
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enhanced board of directors and audit committees, improves the monitoring of the management 
and reduce the asymmetry problems that result in a better performance of the company.289 
 
Therefore, understanding the internal mechanisms of corporate governance is fundamental to 
solve the agency problem and improve the firm performance and value. In the following part, 
we analyze the aforementioned features that have a greater influence on the quality of the board 
of directors and audit committee by reviewing the large literature that studied the relationship 
between these characteristics and the firm performance. 
2.5.1 Board Size 
The Board of directors is considered an important internal corporate governance mechanism 
for aligning the interests of the management and all stakeholders to those of the company and 
shareholders specifically.290 According to Zahra and Pearce, the board has the important role to 
select and replace the CEO, who represents the interest of shareholders and provides counsel to 
the top management, and monitor managers’ actions and company performance.291 Thus, 
through these activities, the board may improve the company’s performance.  
A large portion of the academic research on corporate governance has focused on studying the 
relation between board size and corporate performance. Most of these studies argue the 
existence of a negative association between the two variables.292 Yermack sustains that board 
size is negatively related to firm value, since companies with large board usually use their assets 
less efficiently, resulting in lower profits.293 Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach state that the 
board size is negatively associated with the company’s financial performance and quality of the 
decision-making process.294  Lipton and Lorsch argue that a small board size — eight or nine 
members with at least two independent directors — is ideal in monitoring activities because 
CEO cannot easily exert his influence over the board, and thus results in better corporate 
 
289
 Aldamen et al. (2012). Audit committee characteristics and firm performance during the global financial 
crisis, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 971-1000. 
290 Sanda A., Garba T. & Mikailu A. S. (2008). Board Independence and Firm Financial Performance: Evidence 
from Nigeria, African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, AERC Research paper 213, pp. 1-35. 
291 Zahra S.A., Pearce J.A. (1989). Board of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and 
Integrative Model, Journal of Management, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 291-334. 
292 Isik O., Ince A.R. (2016). Board Size, Board Composition and Performance: An Investigation on Turkish 
Banks, International Business Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 74-84. 
293 Yermack D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 185-211. 
294 Hermalin B., & Weisbach M. (2003). Boards of Directors as an Endogenously-Determined Institution: A 




performance.295 Similarly, Jensen sustains the effectiveness of small board sizes — seven or 
eight members — in improving the firm performance.296 Forbes and Milliken demonstrate that 
in large boards is difficult to coordinate the contribution of the members, and the potential for 
free riding is higher.297 
Conversely, the smaller part of the studies emphasizes a positive relation between board size 
and firm performance. According to Zahra and Pearce, some studies found that large boards 
composed of directors with diverse educational and industrial backgrounds improve the quality 
of the decision-making and make the CEO domination of the board harder to happen.298 Even 
Dalton and Dalton argue that large boards increase the spread of advice and counsel from the 
members to the CEO and executive and promote the diversity of the board in terms of skills, 
experience, age, gender, and race.299 A part of the researchers studied the relationship between 
board size and the capital structure of the company. Berger et al. found that large board size 
creates pressure on the board to make managers pursue lower leverage to increase company 
performance.300 Anderson et al. demonstrate that in firms with large boards the cost of debt is 
lower because this board size may increase the level of managerial monitoring and improve the 
financial accounting process.301  
To summarize, supporters of small board size emphasize the fact that smaller boards may 
improve the quality of the decision-making process and improve the performance of the 
company. A board composed of 7-9 members is the optimal choice for preventing CEO to 
control the board and reducing the agency costs coming from free-riding directors. On the other 
hand, some scholars support large boards in enhancing the quality of the decision-making 
through the promotion of diversity. Moreover, Large boards seem to reduce the leverage and 
cost of debt, leading to better firm performance. 
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2.5.2 Board Composition 
Empirical research on the Board of Directors has highlighted that the composition of the board 
has a direct effect on the company’s performance. The composition of the board generally 
indicates the proportion of inside and outside directors within the board. Outside directors are 
also considered independent directors or non-executive directors.302 The presence of 
independent directors plays an important role in the board performance.303 Outside directors 
who are independent and with no interests common with the managers, seem to monitor the 
management more effectively.304 Since the CEO has less power to influence independent 
directors rather than inside directors, a high portion of outside directors on the board may 
positively affect the performance of the firm.305  
According to this perspective, appointing more outside directors may improve the 
independence and the effectiveness of the board, and thus, the performance of the firm.306 While 
insider directors have a good knowledge of the internal operations of the company, outsider 
directors, as experts in capital markets or corporate law, offer complementary knowledge to 
support insider directors in dealing with specialized decision problems.307 Wan and Ong argue 
that outsider directors are more objective in their deliberation and are more willing to consider 
diverse group ideas in making their decisions. Also, they believe that outsiders bring more 
skills, knowledge, and diverse perspectives because of their provenance from different 
backgrounds and organizations.308 
Of the same opinion is the European Commission that specifically believes that the board 
composition is fundamental for the company’s success thanks to the role of non-executive 
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directors or supervisory boards in overseeing the activity of executive directors or the 
management board.309 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance believe that independent directors are likely to 
contribute significantly to corporate decision-making by bringing an objective view to the 
evaluation of the performance of the board and management.310 In this sense, a sufficient 
number of independent directors should be assigned to the boards where an independent 
judgment to solve potential conflicts of interest is required.311 Since non-executive directors are 
charged with the role to assure the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, their 
presence can guarantee market participants that their interests are preserved.312 
It seems that the company performance is likely to improve with the right balance of insider 
and outsider directors. The role of non-executive directors has been identified in preventing the 
undue exercise of power by executive directors, safeguard shareholders’ interests in board 
decision making, ensuring competitive performance.313 Thus, outsider directors may be found 
in a double position of holding management agents to account, and at the same time of 
contributing to strategic decision making.314 
2.5.3 Board diversity 
As we saw before, some scholars promote the relation between board diversity and firm 
performance. A board with a well-diversified membership in terms of race, gender, age, 
experience, skills, provides a wide range of counsel and advice the CEO may benefit from to 
improve the company decision-making. A large variety of studies show how the diversity on 
the board brings benefits to the company and, thus, is associated with improved firm 
performance. 
 
According to Robinson and Dechant, the diversity on the board has several advantages 
including improving the understanding of the marketplace, fostering creativity and innovation 
involving a broader range of perspectives, and promoting internationalization and human 
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resources motivation.315 In terms of labor market, Rose stated that a high degree of diversity on 
the board is a positive signal to potential job applicants that indicates that women and ethnic 
groups are not excluded from the highest positions, thus attracting well-qualified persons 
outside the typical circle from which board candidates are selected.316 
Besides, the European Commission with the Action Plan 2012 promotes the board diversity as 
a useful corporate governance tool to enhance the transparency of the company. It supports the 
idea that board diversity brings different competencies and views within the board that 
facilitates the understanding of the corporate affairs and foster the objective and constructive 
challenge of directors’ decisions.317 On the other hand, insufficient diversity among the board’s 
members could result in fewer ideas, less debate and challenges of directors decisions, and 
consequently, in less effective oversight of directors’ or management board’s actions.318 
While conflict empirical evidence has been found in the relationship between board diversity 
and age and educational background of the board members, the gender representation theme 
has received growing attention due to increased concern on the point of gender parity.319 Adam 
and Ferreira found a positive relation between female directors and firm performance. They 
found that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, and they are 
more likely to join monitoring and audit committees.320 Accordingly, Bilimoria and Piderit state 
that female directors are likely to be employed on important board committees.321 In 2018 
McKinsey’s report on diversity stated that companies with diverse boards are 33% more likely 
to have greater financial returns than their less-diverse industry peers.322 In contrast, other 
studies found a negative relation between gender diversity and firm performance.323  
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However, although the female representation on the board has become a critical issue on the 
corporate governance framework and is growing exponentially year-by-year, the proportion of 
female directors has not yet reached a satisfactory level. In 2019 in the United States a milestone 
of 20% of women board representation was achieved for S&P 500 and Russell 3000 
companies.324 In Italy, the percentage of women in boards of Italian listed companies grew to 
36% in 2019 but only 6% hold the position of CEO.325 In 2018, California became the first state 
in the United States to impose to all public companies the mandatory representation of at least 
one woman on their boards.326 In Italy according to the Golfo-Mosca lex 120/2011 public 
companies are required to reserve 30% of the boards’ seats to the less represented gender.327 
Like the United States and Italy, also other countries have moved to guarantee greater 
inclusivity of the minorities on the boards and to promote diversity as a tool to enhance the firm 
performance.  
2.5.4 Audit Committee Independence 
In order to reduce information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems an effective audit 
committee that monitors the management is required. As established by the EU Directive 
2006/43/EC, the principal roles of the audit committee are: a) to oversee the company’s 
financial reporting process, b) to monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, 
the audit process, and the firm’s risk management practices, c) to oversee the statutory audit of 
the annual and consolidated reports, to review and control the independence of the statutory 
auditor or audit firm.328 Enhanced monitoring of financial reporting is achieved by ensuring the 
independence of the audit committee.329 Beasley states that the independence of the audit 
committee reduce the opportunities for managers to manipulate financial statements and 
conduct financial fraud activities, thus enhancing the quality of the financial reports and 
improves the credibility and reliability of accounting and financial information.330 Lee et al. 
found that independent audit committees are likely to demand high-quality auditors with high 
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reputations.331 The independence of the audit committee ensures that the decisions are in its 
hands and the management cannot exert its pressure over the committee easily. 
Corporate governance codes all over the world establish requirements on the audit committee 
and its independence.332 For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code sets out that listed 
companies should have at least two-three independent non-executive directors in their audit 
committee.333 In the same way, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes 
stock exchanges to implement rules requiring independent audit committees to monitor the 
company’s accounting and financial reporting processes and audits of the financial 
statements.334 In this sense, the SEC requires U.S. listed companies to have three or more 
independent directors on the audit committee with no mandatory presence of an audit 
committee financial expert.335 As we already discussed in Italy the independence is a required 
quality the auditors must have.336  
However, the appointment of independent directors in the corporate boards is not likely to 
improve the firm performance in every type of company in all countries.337 In close companies 
and family-owned companies, the lower presence of independent directors can be explained by 
the fact that their presence can be viewed as an unnecessary interference and a threat to the 
power of controlling shareholders and their decision-making process.338 In this sense, Leung et 
al. found a negative relation between audit committee independence and audit quality that will 
affect the performance in close and family-owned companies.339 
In summary, audit committee independence is an effective mechanism that enhances the 
monitoring activities and audit quality in listed companies, especially where the separation of 
ownership and control is evident. In close companies and family-owned businesses, where the 
controlling shareholder and director typically is the same person and, thus, no agency problem 
arise between shareholders and managers, the presence of directors not related to the business 
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and with different interests may have the effect to reduce the freedom of the shareholder-
manager to conduct the company as he sees fit and then, resulting in missing investment 
opportunities and jeopardizing the business. 
2.6 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter was aimed at analyzing the corporate governance practices and features in public 
and close companies. We began the chapter by introducing the agency problem that arises in 
the relationships between the actors involved within the company. Then we have proceeded by 
analyzing the distinctions between two corporate governance mechanisms, the insider and 
outsider model, determined by different ownership structures and concentration of control. In 
this sense, we provided an analysis of the United States and Italy corporate governance 
frameworks, as an effective example of outsider and insider systems, respectively. The chapter 
concludes with a description of the internal corporate governance mechanisms used to resolve 
the agency problem. These mechanisms concerning the composition, size, diversity, and 
independence of the corporate boards, have been reviewed by comparing different studies 
aimed at analyzing the relationship of the different mechanisms with the firm performance. 
Despite the results obtained by researchers were discordant, we can confirm that these 
mechanisms have a great effect on corporate performance, driving the organization toward the 
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Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the typical corporate governance instruments that ensure 
more effective control and management of the corporation. However, some corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the independence of the boards and the board composition, 
are most suitable for publicly held companies while in close corporations their application 
becomes more complicated. Especially in the context of closely held companies the traditional 
rules of corporate law seem not to be appropriate for the needs of investors, who tend to rely 
on other instruments to tailor the relationship between each other. In this sense, it is common 
the use of shareholders’ agreements to customize the terms of ownership and to waive some 
governing rules of law. Through these agreements, parties can contract among themselves over 
their votes or decide to maintain a continuum in the ownership structure, and thus, leading the 
business towards a certain long-term direction. Therefore, parties are likely to shape the control 
by the means of shareholders’ agreements rather than through charters and bylaws, because the 
former not only are easier to draft or amend than the charter but also because shareholders’ 
agreements empower shareholders to personally waive rights that cannot be removed by the 
charter and bylaws.340 Besides, under the default majority rule or, even better, when a 
controlling shareholder is present, shareholders’ agreements allow control sharing by 
guaranteeing minority representation on boards. 
 
The present chapter will deal with an understanding of the legal treatment of shareholders’ 
agreements. In particular, we will discuss the concept of shareholders’ agreements along with 
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the purposes of parties to enter into such a contract. Furthermore, we will discuss the main 
characteristics of these agreements, including the content that the contract may have, the 
persons — legal and natural — who can be parties to the shareholders’ agreement, and possible 
classification of such agreements. Finally, we will analyze the use of shareholders’ agreements 
in the context of closely held companies compared to public listed companies, trying to find a 
possible explanation of why shareholders’ agreements are not so diffused in listed companies. 
3.1 The Concept of Shareholders’ Agreements  
Viewed with suspicion and perplexity for a long time by the most conservative and traditionalist 
doctrine and jurisprudence, the shareholders’ agreements seem, nowadays, to shine with a new 
light and relive, or rather live, a kind of second life, a second youth, considered, at long last, as 
a significant control tool and a relevant regulation instrument of corporate dynamics.341  
Concerning its historical evolution, as already anticipated, shareholders’ agreements had a 
troubled genesis due to the difficulty — as stated by the moderated doctrine and jurisprudence 
— to admit as valid and effective any agreement drafted within and then, potentially harmful 
to the company interest. In this way, it was believed that the company interest would be passed 
on the back burner, thus, giving space to the selfish interest of the individual.342 Now, 
fortunately, the validity and the effectiveness of shareholders’ agreements are recognized by 
the legislator which regulates certain aspects (duration, transparency, for example). For 
example, in Italy, all the aspects concerning shareholders’ agreements are regulated in articles 
2341-bis, 2341-ter, and articles 122,123,124 and 207 of D.L.gs. 24.2.1998, n.58).343 It was 
understood that their function is multiple and that they have great relevance as instruments for 
the consolidation of ownership structures and the stabilization of the government of the 
company, allowing, through the commitment of the members who adhere to it, the formation 
of groups within the social structure able to play, thanks to the coordination of the action of 
participants, a significant role in society.344  
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In order to better understand this topic, let us introduce, briefly, the definition of shareholders’ 
agreements by explaining what we will talk about, their role, how they work, and what they are 
for. 
3.1.1 Definition of Shareholders’ Agreements 
By definition, shareholders’ agreements are real and complex agreements drawn up, during the 
foundation of the company or after its foundation, by two or more members — shareholders in 
fact — belonging to listed public companies or private firms. Using these agreements, 
shareholders — who are free to decide what or whether contract, whit whom to contract, and 
on what terms to agree in their contract345 — thus, mitigate and regulate how they will have to 
manage their internal relationship, those with company directors and those with third parties 
eventually.346 In other words, shareholders’ agreement could be considered as a perfectly valid 
contractual tool that helps to regulate relationships inside the company among involved 
members and it should not be considered as a merely “gentlemen’s contract”. These agreements 
— obviously binding for those who sign them only — may contain provisions for non-
compliance sanctioning the defaulting member by the payment of penalties347 and generally are 
written contracts like any contract. These, however, could be oral contracts too although this 
latter may raise some questions related to their reliability and enforceability since involved 
parties could not be able to remember and perform what they have decided at the time of the 
agreement.348 If this happens, parties will have to trust in their good faith only to avoid internal 
quarrels from which problems could arise. 
Once furnished the definition of shareholders’ agreements, now we have to take into 
consideration their contents. Indeed, agreements under study may have different contents — 
provided that they are not contrary to law, public order, or morality — and concern 
administrative positions, property rights, or passive legal situations. This means that, according 
to the aims of shareholders, these agreements deal with various subjects such as succession 
issues, deadlock situations, rights, and duties of shareholders, and so on. It is clear that there is 
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no limited list of aims of shareholders and each theme depends on the interests of parties.349 
The following paragraph of this thesis will face, thus, the aims of shareholders’ agreements.  
3.2 The Aims of Shareholders’ Agreements 
As for all other contracts, in shareholder agreements parties want to create, modify, and 
terminate their rights and duties. For this reason, parties pursue special aims depending on, as 
just said, the interests of shareholders as well as the kind of company. Generally, the aims of 
shareholder agreements may be classified into three major groups which are the following: 1) 
agreements used to concentrate control of the company; 2) agreements with the purpose to 
protect the interests of the minority shareholders; 3) agreements with other aims.350  
As regards the first point, if in a company there are no controlling shareholders, the agreement 
can be used to concentrate voting power and reinforce the influence of contracting shareholders 
in the company. In this case, it might be supposed that the shareholder who owns more stocks 
than the others and then, who has most of the voting rights — although this latter should not 
have the controlling package — has more willing to stipulate the contract but, in truth, even the 
smallest shareholders take advantage from the contract since their interests will be taken into 
consideration during the business of the company. It is also true that by means of the shareholder 
agreement, relatively large members may influence, even exercise, votes of the smaller ones. 
The more the power in the hands of the relatively large shareholders increases, the more these 
latter obtain greater supervision over the management of the company; In this way, costs 
incurred while contracting with smaller shareholders are justified.351 If on the one hand, several 
advantages and benefits are recognized to large shareholders, on the other hand, because of 
their small stake in the company and high costs related to the management control, small 
shareholders are not able to look at and inspect the management of the company.352  In any 
event, if the minority shareholders are interested in long term ownership of the shares and 
participation in the company activities, they may negotiate with large shareholders to obtain 
greater protection of their interests and some extra rights such as the nomination of a member 
of the management body. In the case in which smaller shareholders believe that the relatively 
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large shareholders are acting against their interests, they can, however, invoke the provisions 
of the agreement to safeguard and preserve their interests or, even, withdraw from the contract, 
obviously if all mandatory requirements stipulated in the contract are met.353 Naturally, 
cooperation between relatively large shareholders and the smaller ones is very important for 
avoiding this kind of situation and both of these must be aware of the positions held by each. A 
shareholders’ agreement is a way of furthering the interests of each concerned party without 
discrimination and does not disadvantage or advantage anyone. Briefly, considering this first 
purpose of shareholder agreements, these are used to reinforce contracting shareholders or 
rather upgrade the position of involved members within the company. 
The second aim of shareholder agreements is to protect the interests of minority shareholders. 
This purpose is achieved when a majority or a group of controlling shareholders stipulate the 
agreement with the minority shareholders allowing the latter to express their intentions and 
expectations during the general meeting of shareholders.354 It could be assumed that, by 
stipulating the agreement with the minority, the majority shareholders are not willing to limit 
themselves, their controlling power in the company, or their benefits but, indeed, several 
situations prove otherwise. If a listed company, for example, is increasing its capital, majority 
shareholders will sometimes be asked to enter into shareholder agreement if the monetary 
contribution is significant, thus, these are obliged to collaborate with the minority to provide 
capital to the society.355 In addition to this, the majority may conclude the shareholder 
agreement with the minority when the latter can influence the balance of power between two 
competing block holders. This may happen when two relatively large block holders compete 
for the control of the society and minority shareholders may effectively decide which one of 
them will take its control. In this case, the concentration of voting rights ensures minority 
shareholders more rights and better protection of their interests. In the event of which majority 
shareholders refuse to contract, shareholder agreement may still be concluded among minority 
shareholders.356 
Besides these, it exists other purposes of shareholder agreements. The contractual relationship 
among shareholders could be used to maintain or change the status of the company for example. 
Members may decide or not — by exercising voting rights during the general meeting of 
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shareholders — to alter the structure of the corporation, the number of members, the 
responsibility of the management body, and so on. 
Another aim of shareholders’ agreements could be to avoid deadlock situations. A deadlock 
situation happens when shareholders — whose power is equally released — are unable to agree 
on a particular topic linked to company management. Generally, this kind of situation is more 
common in non-listed companies and highly unlikely in listed-companies due to the ample 
shareholdings distribution even if it could occur in listed-companies too since two major block 
holders may not agree on the line to follow or the strategy of the company.357  
Furthermore, by means of shareholder agreements, concerned parties may agree not only on the 
rules to follow or how company profits have to be distributed through voting rights but also on 
the investments; or even, shareholder agreements can manage succession issues, regulate the 
rights of shareholders to avoid future disputes or decide the dividend distribution policy.358  
It is clear that there are several aims of shareholder agreements where each of them depends on 
different factors, such as the interests of involved parties, the kind of company, or its goals. 
They, in any event, are essential tools aimed at mitigating, managing, and regulating any 
conflicts, or disagreements between parties and safeguarding their interests.  
Once discussed the concept and the aims of shareholders’ agreements, the following paragraphs 
and sub-paragraphs will focus on general characteristics, subject-matters, parties, and forms of 
agreements. 
3.3 Characteristics of Shareholders’ agreements  
Known as consensual contracts since they come into force by the will of concerned parties, 
shareholder agreements may be distinguished in bilateral and unilateral contracts, in onerous 
and gratuitous contracts, and fixed-term or indeterminate period contracts.359 By definition, 
when parties of shareholders’ agreements agree on a topic and have reciprocal rights and duties 
towards each other, we are faced with a bilateral contract. Instead, if this is not the case, we are 
faced with a unilateral contract. For example, when involved parties agree to vote according to 
the rules provided in the shareholder agreement, we can say that it is a bilateral agreement; 
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contrarily, when a shareholder, for instance, obliges himself to vote by following the 
instructions given by another shareholder without considering reciprocal duties, this is an 
example of a unilateral contract.360 
Shareholder agreements may be also distinguished in onerous and gratuitous agreements. For 
example, if there are provisions for performance contractual duties for a pecuniary 
consideration, we are talking about onerous agreements; if instead, a shareholder agreement is 
used to transfer voting rights without any consideration, we are talking about the gratuitous 
one.361 
Finally, shareholder agreements may be concluded for a fixed-term or an indeterminate time. 
The duration of the contract depends on the aims pursued by shareholders and on the applicable 
law as well. It is interesting to note that each country has different rules to follow concerning 
terms and duration: in Italy, for example, a fixed term of shareholders’ agreements cannot be 
longer than 5 years; in the UK and the USA, no rules limiting the term of shareholder 
agreements exist; in Belgium, shareholder agreements should have a fixed term even if a 
maximum term is not established, and so on362. Thus, according to the jurisdiction, there might 
be differences and restrictions related to the maximum term of shareholder agreements and each 
difference depends on the nature and the subject-matters of contracts. 
3.3.1 Content of Shareholders’ Agreements  
Before entering a shareholders’ agreement, parties have to agree on the content and object of 
the contract. The presence of certain matters agreed by the parties is indispensable for the 
validity and the qualification of the contract as shareholders’ agreement. 
Most European legislators — such as France, Germany, U.K., and so on — do not regulate the 
content of shareholders’ agreements at the statutory level. However, in countries — Italy and 
Russia — where shareholders’ agreements are recognized at the legislative level, the list of 
contents that can be the object of the shareholders’ agreements are established by the norms 
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quite similar, their regulation is different: while in Russia the obligations representing the 
content of shareholders’ agreement have the nature of possibility, in Italy, instead, the parties 
are allowed to stipulate a shareholders’ agreement only if the object of the obligation of the 
agreement are those prescribed by the art. 2341-bis of the Civil Code.364 The article specifically 
identifies shareholders’ agreements such agreements concerning (a) the exercise of voting 
rights in a company limited by shares, (b) limits on the transfer of shares, or (c) the exercise, 
jointly or otherwise, of a dominant influence over the company.365 In the United States, the 
regulation of the content of shareholders’ agreements differs depending on the jurisdiction: for 
example, in California, the subject matter of shareholders’ agreements is typically limited to 
the governance of the corporation and the rights between shareholders themselves and towards 
the corporation;366 whereas in others states, such as Delaware, New York, and Florida, there is 
no limitation on the subject matters of shareholders’ agreement which may also concern non-
company matters.367 
Finally, even though in certain cases the content of shareholders’ agreements is specifically 
defined by the legislator, whereas in other cases the parties enjoy greater freedom in 
establishing the object of the matter of the contract, the presence of content related to the 
company and the rights and duties of shareholders is a common condition for both cases to 
qualify the contract as a shareholders’ agreement. 
3.3.2 Parties to Shareholders’ Agreements 
As the name of the agreement suggests, the shareholders’ agreement is a contract stipulated 
between shareholders of the company to regulate some aspects of their relationships. Therefore, 
at least one shareholder, to which the agreement is related, should be a party to the contract. If 
this condition is missing, the contract cannot be deemed as a shareholders’ agreement. 
Generally, the agreement can be concluded only between shareholders, giving the possibility 
for the company to constitute a party as well.368 Nonetheless, certain types of shareholders’ 
agreements, like the relationship agreements in the UK, can be stipulated between the 
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controlling shareholder and the company itself.369 Persons other than shareholders may be 
parties to the agreement depending on the aims and subject matter of the contract. For example, 
managers could be parties to the shareholders’ agreement obliging themselves to comply with 
the provisions of the contract or granting shareholders the right to require for specific 
performance not regulated under the law.370  
A party to the shareholders’ agreement may be the company itself, especially in some of the 
following cases: 1) when shareholders want to commit the company to additional obligations; 
2) to include not stipulating shareholders to undertake some obligations as shareholders group; 
3) to bind the management to act according to what is stipulated in the agreement; 4) when the 
company owns its shares and contracts as a shareholder; 6) when relationship agreements are 
stipulated.371 
The agreement can also be concluded by other parties, even not members of the management 
or the company itself, only when the subject matter of the contract is related to the functioning 
of the company and the relationship between shareholders and the company.372 Conversely, the 
contract cannot be considered a shareholders’ agreement if it stipulates that the shareholder is 
obliged to vote following the instructions of the outside party.373 These provisions, usually 
included in contracts with creditors to protect their interests, prevent the contract to be deemed 
shareholders’ agreement since they are not related to the legal relationships arising between 
shareholders or with the company.374  
In summary, shareholders’ agreements are contract stipulated between shareholders or between 
shareholders and other parties, having as object the functioning of the company or the legal 
relationships between the shareholders or their duties towards the company. 
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3.3.3 Classification of Shareholders’ Agreements 
Little research was devoted to the classification of shareholders’ agreements, and where it 
presents, has not found a common distinction between the different academics and scholars. 
However, generally, we may firstly classify the shareholders’ agreements in the following 
categories according to what they are going to regulate: 1) voting agreement; 2) restrictions on 
the transfer of shares agreements; 3) lock-up agreements; 4) other types of shareholders’ 
agreements. 
Voting agreements concern the disposal of the shareholder voting right at the general meeting. 
They usually regulate the way according to which the voting rights of contracting shareholders 
are exercised. For example, the parties may decide on what decisions to vote in favor of a 
shareholder or they can decide to dispose of their votes in the same way as another 
shareholder.375 Voting agreements may also provide for a preliminary meeting among 
contracting shareholders in which they can decide how they will exercise their vote on the 
decisions included in the agenda of the next general meeting.376 Voting trusts, pooling 
agreements, proxy agreements belong to the voting agreements class in the United States and 
they may typically involve: (a) the transfer of the shares of a company and the voting rights 
attached thereto to another party for a specified period of time (voting trusts); (b) the pooling 
of shareholders votes and the consequent transfer to a third party that exercises the votes as a 
unit (pooling agreements); (c) the transfer of the right to a third party to vote on the behalf of 
the shareholder without any actual transfer of the shares (proxy agreements). 
Shareholders’ agreements are also used to limit contracting shareholders to freely trade their 
shares. The restrictions on the transfer of shares included in these agreements are aimed to 
stabilize the ownership structure of the company allowing shareholders to prevent the entry of 
unwanted shareholders, so determining with whom they will work.377 Restrictions on the 
transfer of shares typically have the form of pre-emption rights in favor of other members. The 
pre-emption clause restricts the possibility to sell the shares outside a predetermined group of 
people. It provides that when the shareholder wants to sell its shares, he shall first offer them to 
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the other shareholders at a certain price determined in the articles of association or at a fair 
price.378  
Like the restrictions on the transfer of shares, lock-up agreements have the function to maintain 
the status quo in the ownership structure of the company. They are employed as a part of the 
initial public offering (IPO) preventing shareholders to alienate their shares for a specific period 
of time.379 The purpose is to avoid excessive selling pressure and to maintain the stability of the 
company’s shares during the first few months following the IPO. 
Along with the main types of shareholders’ agreements mentioned above, other types of 
agreements are available to the parties. First, the securities lending agreement involves the 
transfer of the shares with the attached voting rights from the lender to the borrower; however, 
the latter, after having cast the votes in the general meeting, is compelled to return the shares to 
the legitimate owner.380 Depending on the jurisdiction securities lending agreement is subject 
to different legal treatment. For example, in Belgium, the agreement is viewed as a loan of 
fungible things while in the United Kingdom as an interrelated sale of shares agreements.381 
Second, in the UK a common type of agreement is the relationship agreement. Often stipulated 
between the company and the majority shareholder, relationship agreement involves the 
undertaking of the majority shareholder to act or refrain from taking certain actions toward the 
company, or the limitation of the majority of his rights to control the company to benefit the 
minority shareholders.382 This agreement moves from the voluntary decision of the controlling 
shareholder to limit his power ensuring that the interests of the minority and the company will 
be not expropriated to benefit the controlling shareholder. Finally, controversial is the 
classification of joint venture agreement among the other types of shareholders’ agreements. 
The joint venture agreement, in which the parties agree to pool their resources and share risks 
and profit in accomplishing a specific task, is considered by some authors a shareholders’ 
agreement.383 Undoubtedly, restrictions on the free transferability of shares that can be included 
in a joint venture agreement make it not appropriate for publicly held companies, at least for 
those with no controlling shareholders. For this reason, the joint venture agreement is more 
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applied in close companies for which no active market is available to shareholders for the trade 
of shares. 
A more detailed analysis describing the type and the regulation of shareholders’ agreements in 
Italy and the United States will be provided in the next chapters. 
3.4 Shareholders’ Agreements in Closely Held Companies 
As we already said before, in closely held companies shareholders are not just the residual 
claimants of the company in which they invest their money to receive a return on the 
investment; they generally serve as directors and managers in the company they provide funds. 
Since they do not have a diversified investment portfolio and, consequently, most or all of their 
wealth is invested in a single company, the stocks they own in the corporation represent the 
most of their estate.384 In this context, the basic elements regulating the provisions contained in 
the charter, by-laws, general meeting of shareholders are not adequate to the complex set of 
relationships in which the shareholders in the closely held companies are involved.385 For this 
reason, shareholders’ agreements are used by shareholders to deal with the problems that 
usually arise in close companies and to model the corporate governance of the company to the 
needs of shareholders in this type of corporation. For instance, these agreements may: ensure 
continuity in the shareholder group by restricting the transfer of shares; provide the scheme for 
passing from one generation of shareholders to another; generate liquidity for shareholders 
through the use of buy-out agreements; and so on.386 
In the past, agreements aimed at modifying the classic structure of functions and roles among 
shareholders, directors, and managers were viewed with suspicion by courts, which were 
uncertain about the validity and enforceability of this type of agreement in the context of close 
companies.387 More specifically, in examining the validity of shareholders’ agreements, courts 
ignored whether the agreements were stipulated in a close company or in a public company.388 
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Only recently, when courts have started to recognize the peculiarities of close companies, 
shareholders’ agreements have been treated with more confidence.389 
As we have mentioned before, in closely held companies the application of the traditional 
corporate governance rules, such as the majority rule and the separation of role between 
directors and officers, along with the lack of a public market for the trade of shares creates room 
for the majority opportunism against minority shareholders. The use of freeze-out techniques, 
preventing the minority group to participate in the management or benefiting from the earning 
of the company, makes minority shareholders vulnerable to the actions of the controlling 
shareholder. In this context, shareholders’ agreements are employed to mitigate the effect of 
the application of restrictive traditional corporate norms to close companies.390 Shareholders’ 
agreements have the important role to protect the minority shareholders from the majority, by 
ensuring the participation of the former to the management of the company with important roles 
in the decision-making process.391 Moreover, shareholders’ agreements may be used to assure 
minority shareholders that the majority group will not take new corporate policies contrary to 
the interests of the minority continuing to pursue the desired policies.392  
Another common provision included in close corporations’ shareholders’ agreements is that 
restricting or limiting the ability of the shareholder to voluntarily transfer his shares. This is 
explained by the fact that one of the primary goals of shareholders’ agreements is to ensure the 
continuing in the shareholder structure and, as consequence, to prevent the entry of unwanted 
new shareholders.393 For this reason, these agreements contain provisions providing the 
obligation of shareholders to first offer the shares to the incumbent shareholders or the company 
itself.394 Following the continuity in the shareholder group, shareholders’ agreements are used 
even in situations involving the involuntary transfer of shares, such as subsequently the death 
of one shareholder, the declaration of his bankruptcy, retirement, and so on.395 They provide 
some method to retrieve the shares which have passed out to the shareholder for a reason that 
led to the involuntary transfer.396 The most common method provided by the agreement is the 
mandatory or optional purchase of shares. Although mandatory buy-out provisions are the most 
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desirable, optional purchase provisions may be more appropriate to prevent shareholders to plan 
their retirement when they could obtain the highest price from the sale of their shares.397 
 
Shareholders’ agreements in closely held companies are more widely used compared to publicly 
held companies listed on a stock exchange.398 Even in venture capital-backed private 
companies, these agreements are pervasively used to facilitate the control sharing among 
different investors, namely by empowering non-controlling shareholders to credibly ensure 
directorships over the long term.399 Rauterberg found that 55% of companies conducting an 
IPO in the U.S. in the period 2013-2018 disclose that they have been or are party to a 
shareholders’ agreement, but 40% of companies disclose the termination of shareholders’ 
agreement as of the IPO.400 According to this study, only 15% of companies conducting an IPO 
disclose that they will remain subject to a shareholders’ agreement.401 This confirms the 
common view that shareholders’ agreements are widely diffused in closely held companies, but 
they are most likely subject to termination when these companies are going public.402 
 
In the following subparagraph, we will try to find some possible explanations for the limited 
diffusion and use of shareholders’ agreements in the context of publicly held companies listed 
on a stock exchange. 
3.4.1 The Limited Use of Shareholders’ Agreements’ in Publicly Held Companies 
It is clear that the specific features of closely held companies — the presence of few 
shareholders who serve also as directors and the lack of a public market for the trade of 
company’s stocks which are mainly subject to restrictions on their transfer — reinforce the role 
of shareholders’ agreements as a more appropriate tool for shareholders’ protection.403 On the 
contrary, in publicly held companies shareholders’ protection is traditionally ensured with the 
periodic election of directors, the strict division of powers between shareholders and directors, 
and the compliance with the procedures related to the functioning of the company.404 
 
397 Id. at 220-221. 
398 Bulloch S. N., supra note 388, at 62. 
399 Rauterberg G., supra note 340, at 18. 
400 Id. at 22. 
401 Id. at 23. 
402 Id. at 22. 
403 Rossi G., Le Diverse Prospettive dei Sindacati Azionari nelle Società Quotate e in quelle non Quotate, in Bonelli 
F., Jaeger P. (1993). Sindacati di Voto e Sindacati di Blocco, Giuffrè editore, Milano 1993, pp. 51-74. 
404 Id. at 63. 
73 
 
Shareholders’ agreements tend to alter the traditional rules on which the functioning of the 
public company is based, thereby turning into a threat to the protection of public investors. 
This may explain the tendency of the general doctrine to analyze the issue of shareholders’ 
agreements in the context of close corporations, giving little attention to the use of these 
agreements in publicly held companies. Ventoruzzo in his study tried to identify and explain 
the reasons why shareholders’ agreements are not so used in U.S. listed companies compared 
to close companies. In particular, he comes up with five hypotheses: first, although often the 
ownership structure of public companies presents a blockholder, the presence of shareholders, 
each holding a no meaningful participation — less than 1% — prevent the formation of a 
controlling group; second, minority shareholders are usually institutional investors who do not 
want to limit their freedom in voting or selling their shares and, thus, they are not willing to 
enter into shareholders’ agreements; third, the lack of extensive cross-holding among listed 
companies discourages major shareholders to enter into such agreements; forth, the protection 
of minority shareholders granted by legal rules and some provisions, like the mandatory 
disclosure requirement under the Williams Act of participations large than 5%, deter 
shareholders to stipulate shareholders’ agreements; finally, the presence of legal devices 
enhancing the position of shareholders in the company, like dual-classes shares structures, may 
replace shareholders’ agreements. 405   
However, in a context where the ownership structure is concentrated and the presence of 
institutional investors is not so large, shareholders’ agreements in publicly held companies 
become more valuable. In fact, the concentration of the ownership is traditionally considered 
as one of the factors which prompts the greater occurrence of shareholders’ agreements as 
instruments to stabilize the control of the company.406 Furthermore, in systems characterized 
by concentrated ownership, the role of shareholders in making strategic decisions is 
predominant, since shareholders intensively and directly communicate with the management.407 
Thus, in presence of shareholders holding a relevant and homogeneous ownership stake, there 
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is a powerful incentive to define through shareholders’ agreements — elements external to the 
corporate governance — the allocation of power in order to stabilize it.408 
For instance, according to CONSOB 23% (86) of Italian listed companies were governed 
through a shareholders’ agreement with the conclusion of 39 new agreements in 2019.409 At the 
end of 2018, 10% of listed companies in Italy were controlled through a shareholders’ 
agreement.410 Nevertheless, the use of shareholders’ agreements is experiencing a decreasing 
trend. 
Finally, it is possible to observe that shareholders’ agreements are still used as a tool to enhance 
corporate governance in Italy and countries with similar ownership patterns. What has changed 
during the years is the content of shareholders’ agreements, passing from the voting control to 
the simple regulation of shareholders’ behaviors.411 
 
3.5 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter provides an overview of the role of shareholders’ agreements in the corporate 
governance of most closely held companies. Viewed in their infancy with suspicion, today 
shareholders’ agreements are generally accepted to shape the control and ownership of the 
company. We defined them as a valid contractual tool that helps to regulate relationships inside 
the company among involved members. In particular, parties enter into a shareholders’ 
agreement for different purposes of which the most common involve the concentration of 
control and the protection of the minority interests. Then, we described the common 
characteristics of shareholders’ agreements, including the content, the parties involved, and a 
classification of these types of contracts.  
 
We have seen that in Italy the legislator imposes shareholders’ agreements to be concluded 
upon the content established by the law in the article 2341-bis of the Civil Code, while other in 
the other countries parties enjoy greater freedom in choosing the content of the agreement with 
the condition that this must be related to the relationship among shareholders or between 
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shareholders and the company. In fact, not exclusively shareholders may be parties of 
shareholders’ agreements, but also other parties, such as managers, third parties, and the 
company itself may be parties of the agreement only if the contract involves the functioning of 
the company or the rights or duties of shareholders toward the company. 
These agreements can be classified in voting agreements — concerning the exercise of 
shareholders’ voting rights — restriction on the transfer of shares, lock-up agreements — which 
prevent shareholders to alienate the shares for a period of time — and other types of agreements.  
These provisions are typically found in closely held companies. The traditional corporate rules 
of majority vote, the separation of ownership and control, and the impossibility to freely transfer 
the shares in a public market whenever shareholders want, create severe problems for close 
corporations. The use of shareholders’ agreements mitigates such problems allowing 
shareholders to structure the control of the company and their relationships as they see fit. 
After having analyzed the application of shareholders’ agreements in closely held companies, 
we try to find some explanations relating to the limited use of them in the context of publicly 
held companies. Empirical evidence shows us how their use in listed companies is more 
common in countries where the ownership is more concentrated, like in Italy than in Civil Code 
countries where the ownership is more dispersed. Despite it is evident that shareholders’ 
agreements are more suited to be concluded in close companies, where parties require more 
flexibility to structure the governance of the company and to regulate the relationship between 
each other, the application of these agreements in publicly held listed companies is not so rare. 
Clearly, in this context in which the majority rule and the free transferability of shares are 
essential for the correct functioning of the company, shareholders’ agreements are more 
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Introduction 
In the United States, agreements concluded between shareholders to regulate the relationships 
between themselves and towards the management body of the company are governed by special 
legislation. The fundamental rules governing shareholders’ agreements may be found at the 
State Law level, with slight differences from State to State.412 Hence, each State has adopted 
provisions in its corporation code regulating the shareholders’ agreements.413 Typical 
provisions included in shareholders agreements concern share transfer restrictions, the identity 
of directors, officers’ salaries, arbitration to resolve disputes, dividend amounts.414 Specifically, 
MBCA section 7.32 regulates shareholders’ agreements in closely held companies. In 
particular, it permits shareholders agreements having as object: (a) the elimination or restriction 
of powers of the board of directors; (b) the authorization to distribute dividends whether in 
proportion or not to the ownership of shares; (c) the determination of directors and officers and 
the condition and terms for their selection and removal; (d) the exercise or allocation of voting 
power between shareholders and directors; (e) the establishment of terms and conditions of any 
agreement for the transfer or use of property; (f) the transfer to one or more shareholders or 
another person of the authority to manage the business or to exercise corporates powers, and to 
resolve deadlock situations among directors or shareholders; (g) the demand of dissolution of 
the company at the request of one or more shareholders or at the occurrence of certain events; 
(h) the determination of the exercise of corporate powers or the management of the company’s 
affairs or the relationships between insiders within the company not contrary to public policy.415 
The original text provided for the termination of shareholders’ agreements from the time when 
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the company’s shares were listed on a stock market. The revised version of 2016 eliminates this 
provision, but it keeps the requirement of unanimous shareholder approval, this is likely to 
make shareholders’ agreement under section 7.32 MBCA practically unavailable to publicly 
held companies. 
In this chapter we will analyze the most common types of shareholders’ agreements concluded 
in the United States, namely voting agreements and transfer restrictions agreements. After 
having defined the characteristics of these types of agreements, we will explore the disclosure 
requirements of shareholders’ agreements for public listed companies and the enforceability of 
such agreements. 
4.1 Voting Agreements  
As we already said, voting agreements are intended to regulate the exercise and disposal of 
shareholders’ voting rights in the context of the general meeting. Delaware Code explicitly 
allows shareholders to conclude agreements among them related to the exercise of the voting 
rights attached to the shares held.416 Thereby, shareholders are entitled to allocate their voting 
rights as they see fit, by agreeing to cast their votes under indications of one of them or the 
majority.417 This means that the law explicitly legitimates contracts that allow shareholders to 
vote their shares as a unit unless they have the effects of limiting the discretion of directors, 
violating any statutory provision, or oppressing the other stockholders.418 Voting agreements 
are particularly designed to alter the default system for electing members of the board of 
directors, by conferring on one or more shareholders the right to appoint one or more 
directors.419 
In most early cases, U.S. courts deemed voting agreements invalid on the grounds that the 
power to vote was inseparable from the shares and that shareholders owe to each other a 
fiduciary duty to vote in the meetings in the best interest of the corporation.420 However, today 
a positive trend toward the general validity of voting agreements has been adopted by courts. 
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Among voting agreements, special provisions are addressed to voting trusts, pooling 
agreements, and proxy agreements. 
4.1.1 Voting Trusts 
A voting trust is concluded when shareholders transfer shares and the associated voting rights 
to a third party, called trustee, who votes in accordance with what has been established by the 
agreement.421 Although the trustee becomes the legal owner of the shares, the shareholder 
usually maintains the economic benefit of the shares: in fact, any dividend received by the 
trustee is typically forwarded by the latter to the shareholder that retains beneficial ownership 
of the shares.422 The economic benefit of the shares is usually demonstrated by a voting trust 
certificate provided by the trustee to the former shareholder.423 At the end of the trust period, 
the shares are returned to the former shareholders, unless the agreement provides for a renewal 
of the contract at the same terms. 
Voting trusts are regulated by the Delaware code tit. 8 § 218 and by the Model Business 
Corporation Act § 7.30. They both contain similar provisions stating that to be correctly formed, 
the voting trust: (a) must be concluded by one or two or more shareholders; (b) must provide 
the transfer to the shares to the trustee or trustees; (c) expires after the term stated in the 
agreement; (d) must be disclosed to the company.424 While the Delaware code provides that the 
agreement must be in writing, the MBCA does not explicitly state that the written form is 
required, although it can be understood from the context of the provisions.425 While historically 
the MBCA imposed a statutory term of 10 years for the voting trust, the amendment of 2016 
ratified the duration of the voting trust that is determined in the term of the agreement.426 Thus, 
it followed the position taken by the Delaware code according to which the term is determined 
in the agreement.427 The two codes impose different rules for the communication of the voting 
trust to the company. The MBCA states that the trustee has to prepare a list and send copies of 
this list and the agreement to the company principal office.428 On the other hand, the Delaware 
code requires that a copy of the trust agreement be filed in the registered office of the 
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corporation and be open for inspection of any stockholder of the corporation or any beneficiary 
of the trust.429  
Despite the statutory regulation, voting trusts are not so employed in the United States context. 
This is due probably to the application of the federal law which treats the trust certificate as a 
security, and, thus, it must be subject to extensive continuous disclosure to the SEC.430  
4.1.2 Pooling Agreements 
Pooling agreements are set when shareholders agree to vote their shares according to what is 
stated in the agreement.431 Pooling agreements do not involve the transfer of shares to a trustee 
and they typically involve: (a) voting shares for directors; (b) giving voting power 
disproportionate to the ownership of shares; (c) voting shares to pursue a particular corporate 
policy.432 
As for voting trusts, pooling agreements are regulated by title 8 § 218 of the Delaware Code, 
while they are regulated by section 7.31 of the MBCA. They are generally treated as voting 
agreements and to be enforceable they must satisfy the following conditions: (a) two or more 
shareholders must be parties of the agreement; (b) the agreement must be in written form; (c) 
all participating shareholders must sign the agreement.433 
Pooling agreements, concerning the issues discussed before, have been generally considered 
lawful and enforceable, contrary to such agreements aimed at selling shareholders’ votes or 
compromise voting power to extract private benefit invalidated by courts.434 
4.1.3 Proxy Agreements 
Proxy agreements allow shareholders to confer irrevocable proxies with the power to vote their 
shares to one or more shareholders or another person.435 The validity of irrevocable proxies has 
been questioned by courts, specifically on several grounds that they were contrary to the public 
policy by restricting the principal right of shareholders to vote their shares and that a proxy 
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shall be revocable and subject to the statutory limitation on the duration unless it is coupled 
with interest.436  
However, today irrevocable proxies are enforceable and regulated by the provisions contained 
in section 7.22 of the MBCA and section 212 of the Delaware Code. Both codes provide that 
shareholders may appoint a proxy to vote on his behalf by signing an appointment form or 
authorizing the electronic transmission to the person who will hold the proxy.437 The proxy 
agreement must contain information demonstrating that the proxy was authorized by the 
shareholder.438 The duration of the proxy is limited to 11 months for the MBCA and 3 years for 
the Delaware Code unless the proxy provides for a longer period.439 The proxy is irrevocable if 
it states that is irrevocable and is coupled with interest, whether on the stock or on the company, 
strong enough to justify an irrevocable power.440 The appointment of a proxy is effective when 
the signed form or the electronic communication is received by the inspector or by the person 
in charge to tabulate votes.441 
Rarely used by itself as an agreement, the irrevocable proxy is generally applied to implement 
other shareholders’ agreements or class voting arrangements.442 
4.2 Transfer Restrictions Agreements  
According to what has been said before, shareholders in close companies seek to restrict the 
transfer of shares for a variety of reasons, including to control with whom former shareholders 
are going to work, to prevent the entry of undesired shareholders gaining access to internal 
confidential information, and to limit the number of shareholders for administrative 
flexibility.443 
Under the Delaware Code and the MBCA restrictions on the transfer of shares may be imposed 
by articles of incorporation, bylaws, and by shareholders’ agreements.444 The restriction shall 
not apply to the shares issued before the restriction unless shareholders holding those shares 
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participated or voted in favor of the restriction.445 Delaware code expressly provides that 
restrictions on transfers of shares must be in writing,446 whereas, although MBCA does not 
expressly provide for the written form, the requirement may be understood by the nature of the 
provision.447 Both codes provide that a restriction on the transfer of shares is not enforceable 
against a person without knowledge of the restriction unless it is noted conspicuously on the 
shares certificate or is contained in the information statement.448 Further, the Delaware Code 
and MBCA require that to be enforceable transfer restrictions must be concluded for a 
reasonable purpose including (a) maintaining the corporation’s status, when it is dependent on 
the number and identity of shareholders, and maintaining any tax advantages; (b) preserving 
any statutory or regulatory advantage under federal or state securities law; (c) for every other 
reasonable purpose.449 Finally, the law establishes the permitted types of transfer restrictions 
including (a) provisions that obligate shareholder to first offer to the corporation, other 
shareholders, or another person the restricted shares he intend to sell — for example, rights of 
first refusal, rights of first offer, tag-along and drag-along rights; (b) provisions obligating the 
corporation, shareholders, or another person to buy shares subject to the restriction agreement 
— for example, mandatory sale provisions; (c) provisions that require the corporation or 
shareholders to approve any proposed transfer of restricted shares; (d) provisions prohibiting 
the transfer of restricted shares to designated persons or classes of persons, if the prohibition is 
not manifestly unreasonable.450 
In the following paragraph, we will discuss the regulatory requirements of the most common 
provisions adopted to restrict the transfer of shares, namely right of first refusal and right of 
first offer, mandatory sale provisions, tag-along and drag-along rights. 
4.2.1 Right of First Refusal and Right of First Offer 
The right of first refusal and the right of first offer are often included in shareholders’ 
agreements to maintain the status quo in the ownership of the company by offering the 
opportunity to the corporation and/or former shareholders to purchase the shares that any 
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shareholder wants to sell.451 A right of first refusal (“ROFR”) provides that the shareholder 
desiring to sell its shares must offer to the corporation and/or other shareholders the shares at 
the same price and terms received from a third party, and only if the corporation and/or 
shareholders do not exercise the option, the shareholder may offer the shares to outsiders.452 
Conversely, a right of first offer (“ROFO”) provides that the selling shareholder first offer the 
shares to other shareholders and/or to the company, and, if the offer is refused or it wants to 
seek offers from outsiders, it may sell the shares to third parties at a price not lower or terms 
less favorable to those offered by other shareholders and/or the company.453 
Delaware law explicitly states that ROFR and ROFO are enforceable if they are not 
unreasonable. However, some problems may arise in the application of these rights.454 First, the 
ROFR requires potential investors to necessarily expose their offers that, if not implemented 
with a ROFO, the right can hinder the marketability of the restricted shares.455 Second, if the 
right is applied not on all shares but some of them, it may discourage the purchase of shares by 
potential investors who would inevitably enter into a minority vulnerable position.456 For this 
reason,  these rights typically involve the offer of all the shares ensuring also that selling 
shareholders are not left with a too small ownership stake that is economically hard to sell.457 
Finally, another problem is created by the choice of the method used to determine the price at 
which the restricted shares are to be purchased. Although a variety of methods is available, each 
of them has some limitations in estimating the value of the company, and thereby the value of 
shares: if the appraisal method has the effect of ignoring the value of goodwill and intangible 
assets, the multiple method is complex to implement, because it requires future earnings 
projections to be made.458  
4.2.2 Mandatory Sale Provisions  
The mandatory sale provision requires a shareholder to sell its shares to the corporation or 
former shareholders about the occurrence of certain circumstances, such as the death, 
retirement, or termination of shareholder employment.459 This provision is typically included 
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in shareholders’ agreements to preserve the ownership structure of the company to a limited 
group of shareholders.460 
Mandatory sale provisions fall under the restrictions on the transfer of shares concerning the 
sale of the shares to the corporation or other shareholders regulated by section 202(c)(4) tit. 8 
of the Delaware Code. Although some states like New York do not statutory recognize the types 
of transfer restrictions, courts held that mandatory sale provisions are lawful and enforceable, 
unless they are not reasonable.461  
Gaps between the fair value of the shares at the date of repurchase and the value included in the 
agreement do not have the effect to invalidate the restriction itself, but often the intervention of 
courts in determining a more accurate value of shares was necessary.462 However, disparities 
between the fair value of shares and their purchase price were not held by courts when they 
involved the repurchase of shares held by employees. This may be explained by the fact that 
employees typically receive shares of the company as a consequence of the employment and as 
an incentive to align their interests with the interests of the company.463 
4.2.3 Drag-Along and Tag-Along Rights 
A shareholder exercising a drag-along right may force other shareholders to sell their shares at 
the same terms and price offered to the selling shareholder.464 These provisions are used also in 
corporate transactions such as mergers and sales of substantially of the company’s assets to 
force the sale.465 On the other hand, a tag-along right provides that selling shareholders propose 
other shareholders to sell a pro-rata portion of their shares at the same terms and price to the 
same purchaser.466 Tag-along rights typically are used to give minorities the possibility to enjoy 
the control premium which can result from the sale of shares and to give the possibility to other 
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Although Delaware law specifically allows shareholders to sell their shares to the corporation, 
other shareholders, and other persons, case law concerning drag-along and tag-along rights is 
scarce. While courts generally not ruled the enforceability of tag-along rights, the discussion on 
drag-along rights is more complicated. The Delaware Court of Chancery in the case Shields v. 
Shields (1985) ruled the enforceability of shareholders’ agreements forcing investors to sell 
their shares in the event of a merger.468 The enforceability of drag-along rights permits 
shareholders to force the sale of the shares waiving legal protections, such as appraisal rights, 
disclosure obligations, that would be applicable in merger transactions.469 Although courts 
generally enforce waivers of appraisal rights when shareholders are fully informed on them, 
neither Delaware and other state courts expressly enforced these waivers in the context of a 
drag-along sale.470  
4.2.4 Call Options and Put Options  
Shareholders’ agreements typically include call and put options as rights to liquidate the 
ownership position in the corporation. Specifically, a call option is an agreement providing to 
a party a unilateral right to buy the ownership position from the counterparty at a determined 
time and a certain price previously fixed in the agreement or ascertainable by reference to a pre-
determined formula.471 On the other hand, a put option is the right of a shareholder to 
unilaterally require shareholder, group of shareholders, or the company itself to purchase its 
shares at a specific time and a predetermined price fixed in the agreement or ascertainable by a 
pre-agreed formula.472 
Call and put options are typically exercised when specific circumstances arise, such as death, 
disability, insolvency of the shareholder, breach of shareholders’ agreements, termination of 
the employment of employees holding a small ownership stake, and so on.473 These options are 
commonly used in the sale of only part of shareholders’ shares to ensure them to be not trapped 
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in the company with a small holding unlikely to be sold; by exercising their put option right 
shareholders may easily sell their shares at better terms than that otherwise be obtained in the 
market.474  
Another application of call and put options rights may be found in the purchase of minority 
shareholdings. In these transactions, the inclusion of puts and calls options allows the buyer to 
buy other shares to hold a more significant percentage of the share capital or to sell the shares 
back.475 
As already mentioned before, Delaware law explicitly authorizes puts and calls options that are 
included in the obligations stated in section 202(c)(2) tit. 8 of the Delaware Code. It specifically 
provides the validity and enforceability of restrictions on the transfer of shares that oblige other 
shareholders, the corporation itself, or other persons, to buy shares subject to an agreement 
concerning the purchase and sale of restricted shares.476  
 
4.3 Disclosure Requirements 
As we already discussed, the phenomenon of shareholders’ agreements in the United States has 
always been confined to the close corporations, on the other hand remarking a kind of 
incompatibility with the public listed companies. This incompatibility is due to several factors, 
such as the particular ownership structure of U.S. listed companies characterized by widely 
dispersed ownership, the large presence of institutional investors holding an ownership stake in 
the company, and the presence of an efficient system for protecting minority shareholders. All 
these factors — discussed in the previous chapter — discourage shareholders or make less 
meaningful the stipulation of shareholders’ agreements in the context of public listed 
companies. 
Moreover, the U.S. regulatory framework discourages the formation of relevant positions in the 
ownership structure of the company making it difficult the creation of agreements among 
shareholders aimed at influencing the corporate governance of the company. In particular, the 
federal regulatory framework imposes extensive disclosure requirements for relevant share 
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1934.477 Introduced by the Williams Act of 1968, Regulation 13D requires within 10 days from 
the purchase the filing of Schedule 13D with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) when a person or a group acquires more than 5% of a class of company’s equity shares.478 
An ownership stake of this dimension makes the holders “insiders” to public companies whose 
securities transactions fall within the type of those to be observed. In this context, the creation 
of a shareholders’ agreement that aggregates more than 5% of the company’s share capital 
would lead parties to the agreement to be considered insiders, who would be subject to strict 
disclosure requirements that can be harmful especially if they are institutional investors. 
Therefore, differently from Italy, in U.S. legal framework a specific regulation of shareholders’ 
agreements disclosure has not been developed. Clearly, close companies are not obliged to 
publicly disclose shareholders’ agreements, despite they must file the charter with the Secretary 
of State.479 The MBCA, which before the revised version of 2016 expressly limited its 
provisions to close corporation, provides only for internal confidentiality of shareholders’ 
agreements. Section 7.32 provides that the existence of the agreement shall be noted on the 
front or back of each certificate of outstanding shares or on the information sheet required, and 
the failure to note its existence does not affect the validity of the agreement but entitles the party 
who, at the time of purchase, did not have knowledge of its existence to require the rescission 
of the purchase.480 
A provision regulating the disclosure of shareholders’ agreements in listed companies can be 
found in Section 12(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, the text of the 
provisions refers only to voting trusts agreements requiring that, at the time of registration of 
shares of companies listed in a domestic stock exchange, the issuer must disclose “voting trusts 
agreements with respect to, the issuer and any person, directly and indirectly, controlling or 
controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with the issuer”.481 The law provides 
the full disclosure of the voting trust, as if it were statutory documentation, even in the close 
companies.482 The provision concerns exclusively voting trust agreements and no reference is 
 
477 Joyce T., supra note 376, at 356. 
478 Fed. Reg. 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 – Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G. 
479 Rauterberg G., supra note 340, at 22. 
480 See Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.32(c), 2016. 
481 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(2). 
482 See Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.30(a), 2016. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 218(a), 2005. Cited in Guaccero 
A., supra note 407, at 297. 
87 
 
made for other classes of shareholders’ agreements. Therefore, the regulation cannot be 
compared to that of art. 122 T.U.F. for shareholders’ agreements in Italian listed companies. 
4.4 Enforcement of Shareholders’ Agreements 
As we saw before regarding voting agreements, historically U.S. courts have been reluctant to 
validate shareholders’ agreements concerning the exercise of voting rights in the meetings. The 
same inclination has been adopted in ruling the enforceability of shareholders’ agreements 
concerning directors’ decisions. The invalidity of such agreements is basically due to the 
violation of the corporate mandatory rule vesting directors with the exclusive authority to 
manage the affairs of the corporation, and any agreement having the effect of altering the 
allocation of management powers shall be deemed invalid.483 
However, today the tendency of courts is moved toward a general acceptance of shareholders’ 
agreements both concerning voting rights and directors’ powers. Generally, shareholders’ 
agreements should be enforceable if they do not affect other shareholders, creditors, and third 
parties. Instead, limits and duties can be set regarding the conduct of the controlling shareholder 
towards minority shareholders.484 Nevertheless, the law provides for statutory prerequisites 
shareholders’ agreements must comply with to be enforceable. Specifically, the MBCA and 
Delaware Code establish the requirements for the enforceability of shareholders’ agreements.485 
The MBCA in section 7.32 specifies the following requirements shareholders’ agreements must 
have to be enforceable: (a) the agreement shall be set forth in the articles of association or 
bylaws and approved by all shareholders, or in a written agreement signed by all shareholders 
at the time the agreement is concluded;486 (b) the agreement shall be unanimous;487 (c) the 
agreement shall be known by the corporation.488 The amendment to the MBCA of 2016 has 
removed the 10 years term on the duration of the agreement, giving to parties the flexibility to 
determine the duration of the agreement that must be set forth in it.489 
Similarly, Delaware code tit.8 sections 350, 351, and 354 provide the following requirement 
for shareholders’ agreements enforceability: (a) the agreement shall be set forth in the certificate 
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of incorporation if shareholders unanimously vote that the management of the corporation vests 
in the hands of shareholders rather than directors,490 or a written agreement among shareholders 
approved by the majority of them entitled to vote if the purpose of the agreement is to restrict 
the power of directors;491 (b) the corporation must be a close corporation.492 
We can conclude that shareholders’ agreements are generally enforceable. However, a doubt 
arises concerning whether they should be enforced like other agreements or not. Differently 
from other contracts, a breach of a shareholders’ agreement typically results in courts ordering 
a specific performance rather than awarding damages.493 The reason stands in the high 
speculative nature of damages which makes them an inadequate remedy for breaches of 
shareholders’ agreements.494 The application of injunctive relief is allowed to the recurrence of 
specific circumstances, including the situation when the compensation remedy is inadequate to 
restore the damage suffered by the injured party.495 In this sense, courts commonly provided 
for the following remedies496: (a) voiding corporate actions and decisions taken in violation of 
the agreement; 497 (b) reforming the agreement, or articles of incorporation to reflect the 
agreement;498 (c) voiding the transfer of shares;499 (c) ordering an accounting;500 (d) ordering 
for compensatory and punitive damages.501 Moreover, the U.S. legal framework acknowledges, 
through national statutory rules, provisions that expressly allow the specific execution of voting 
agreements.502  
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4.5 Chapter Conclusions 
The present chapter was aimed at analyzing the regulation of shareholders’ agreements in the 
United States framework. Each U.S. state regulates these agreements with the provisions 
contained in its corporate code, with slight, but not relevant differences from one to another. In 
this chapter, we have explored the two most applied codes, namely the Model Business 
Corporation Act and the Delaware Code, that represent the referring point for the statutory 
codes enacted in the other states.  The most common types of shareholders’ agreements concern 
the exercise of voting rights in shareholders’ meetings and the restrictions applied to the transfer 
of shares. The former, voting agreements are concluded between shareholders to alter the 
default rule of the majority, thus, they specifically grant parties, who enter into the contract, the 
power to vote as a unit to take resolutions on matters decided at the shareholders’ meeting. For 
these particular features, they have viewed with suspicion from the courts which in almost all 
cases have ruled their invalidity. Although in recent cases, the view of courts has moved to a 
general acceptance of the validity of voting agreements. Among voting agreements, we 
discussed voting trusts, pooling agreements, and proxy agreements to whom the U.S. corporate 
law addresses specific provisions. Both Delaware Code and the MBCA set the requirements 
these agreements must comply with to be deemed as valid. Voting trusts and proxy agreements 
involve the transfer of the voting right to a third party, but if in the former, who receives the 
shares becomes the legal owner of them but the economic benefit is still in the hands of 
transferring shareholders, on the other hand, the latter solely grant a third party the right to vote 
on the behalf of the shareholder who owns the shares.  
Shareholders’ agreements including provisions that restrict the transfer of the shares are used 
by parties to maintain the status quo of the corporation and control the composition of the group 
of shareholders. Provisions typically regulated by these agreements involve: a) pre-emptive 
rights for the company or remaining shareholders to buy the shares offered by the selling 
shareholders — right of first offer and first refusal; b) mandatory sale to the corporation or 
former shareholders upon the occurrence of certain events — mandatory sale provision; c) 
minorities’ rights to sell the shares at the more convenient conditions offered to the majority 
shareholder — drag-along and tag-along rights; d) rights to require the purchase or sale of the 
ownership stake at a certain time and conditions — call and put options. 
Regarding disclosure requirements, since shareholders’ agreements were thought in the context 
of close corporations, the U.S. legal system does not provide for specific regulation of the 
disclosure requirements that are remanded to the SEC. This is because participations of 
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shareholders who entered into an agreement among themselves are considered as a unit and, 
thus, exposed to the strict rule 13D of disclosure requirements for relevant share participation. 
Hence, this limited the stipulation of shareholders’ agreements in public listed companies. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the description of the requirements needed by the law — 
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The Italian context has been always permeated by the presence of agreements concluded 
between shareholders in a corporation with the purpose to stabilize the corporate management 
and the ownership structure of the corporation. However, before 1998 this presence has been 
only encountered in a practical way, while in the legislative framework no provisions regulating 
shareholders’ agreements were provided.503 Indeed, the comprehensive regulation of 
shareholders’ agreements (patti parasociali) was first introduced in 1998 with the Consolidated 
Law on Finance (TUF) — namely, the legislative decree 58/1998 — but only regarding listed 
public companies.504 Particularly, articles 122 and 123 include first of all a definitive and 
express recognition of the legitimacy and validity of shareholders’ agreements, meant as 
instruments for the development of the private autonomy of shareholders in flexibly designing 
the organizational structure of the company.505 The legislator wanted to ensure the transparency 
of agreements’ content by imposing a mandatory disclosure with the aim of making investors 
more aware of their investment decisions and encouraging the development of the market.506  
 
Consequently, the reform of company law of 2003 has established the recognition of 
shareholders’ agreements in the context of the Civil Code, regulating these agreements in both 
close companies and not listed companies that resort to capital markets.507 Articles 2341-bis 
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and 2341-ter of Civil Code determine the object of shareholders’ agreements, as well as the 
duration and the transparency through disclosure requirements. Especially, shareholders’ 
agreements stipulated in close corporations are only subject to the provisions of article 2341-
bis c.c., while agreements concluded between shareholders in companies that resort on capital 
markets, in addition to the provisions of the abovementioned articles, are regulated also by the 
provisions of article 2341-ter c.c. in terms of disclosure requirements.508 Agreements concluded 
in listed public companies are still regulated by the provisions of article 122 TUF.509  
Article 2341-bis c.c. states that shareholders’ agreements can be stipulated in any form in order 
to stabilize the ownership structure or the governance of the company and have as object: (a) 
the exercise of voting rights in the company or in companies that control them; (b) the limitation 
on the transfer of shares in these companies or in companies that control them; (c) the exercise, 
even jointly, of dominance on the aforementioned companies, may not have a duration longer 
than 5 years and they shall be deemed to have been concluded for such duration even if the 
parties provided for longer duration; these agreements shall be renewable upon expiry.510 
Article 2341-ter c.c. provides for companies that resort from capital markets the obligation to 
communicate the agreement to the company and disclose it at the beginning of each general 
meeting.  
Article 2341-bis c.c. identifies three types of shareholders’ agreements, namely voting 
agreements (sindacati di voto), blocking agreements (sindacati di blocco), and controlling 
agreements (sindacato di gestione), that will be treated later in the following paragraphs. In this 
chapter we also discuss the disclosure requirements for listed companies and, to conclude, we 
analyze the enforceability of such agreements.  
 
5.1 Voting Agreements  
As defined by the United States jurisprudence, voting agreements, identified as “sindacati di 
voto” in the Italian context, are contracts entered between shareholders to bind the contracting 
parties to exercise their voting rights in the general meeting in compliance with the decisions 
taken according to what established by the agreement.511 These agreements may simply bind 
contracting parties to a preliminary mutual consultation before each meeting or may bind them 
 
508 Marchini P.L., Lugli E., supra note 343, at 36. 
509 Id. 
510 Civil Code art. 2341-bis Italy, 2003. 
511 Marchini P.L., Lugli E., supra note 343, at 37. 
93 
 
to vote according to what has been preventively decided by the majority.512 Through the 
application of voting agreements parties are allowed to form a corporate control group and to 
ensure continuity in the current conduct of business.513 Voting agreements can be stipulated 
permanently or for a single meeting, and the exercise of voting rights according to the 
agreement can be referred to all meetings’ resolutions or just for specific resolutions as for the 
election of directors.514 Voting agreements may also be distinguished in: (a) unanimous voting 
agreement (sindacato di voto all’unanimità) concluded for a limited period of time according 
to which shareholders agree unanimously to cast votes in a certain manner; (b) majority voting 
agreement (sindacato di voto a maggioranza) in which the decision is taken with the majority 
of shareholders.515 
Among voting agreements can be included shareholders’ agreements providing for a preventive 
consultation of contracting parties. Differently from simple voting agreements, their provisions 
are not related to the exercise of voting rights during the meeting, but instead, they provide for 
a preventive consultation about how contracting parties are going to cast their vote in the next 
meeting. This agreement aims to enhance the awareness of parties about social and economic 
decisions before the meeting, while parties remain free to cast their vote as they see fit.516 
For a long time, Doctrine and Jurisprudence have considered voting agreements unlawful based 
on the traditional theory formed of two main arguments.517 First, the nature of the voting right 
determines its non-transferability and the impossibility to separate it from the ownership of the 
share.518 Hence, shareholders cannot divest themselves of the right to vote neither through the 
sale of the vote nor partially committing themselves to exercise it in a pre-determined way.519 
Second, the application of voting agreements could have undermined the proper functioning of 
shareholders’ meeting since they have the effect of altering the balance between power, risk, 
and responsibility which is the basis of the autonomous decision-making process that a 
shareholder should follow.520 According to this doctrine, the possibility of taken decisions 
before and outside the meeting would result in a violation of statutory rules stating that 
shareholders’ will should be formed during the meeting, and even of the majority rule 
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attributing the control of the company to a person who does not own the majority share of 
capital.521  
Moreover, the admissibility of voting agreements deliberating to the majority has been 
challenged because of their attitude to circumvent the majority rule underlying the meeting 
resolutions.522 Through these agreements, the minority is allowed to impose on shareholders 
who effectively constitute the majority thanks to their prevalence in the agreement.523 In this 
way, Ascarelli, despite being an advocate of the legitimacy of voting agreements, introduced a 
limit on the validity of them, denying it to agreements deliberating to the majority.524  However, 
the art. 93 (1)(b) TUF indirectly provides for the validity of voting agreements deliberating to 
the majority since they allow a shareholder, who entered into an agreement with other 
shareholders, owning enough voting rights to exercise a dominant influence on the general 
meeting to effectively control the company.525 
In asserting the validity of voting agreements, De Gregorio did not support the indistinct 
validity of them, but rather he affirmed the need to first ensure that the content of a voting 
agreement has been determined according to the interests of the company, its application does 
not injure the person against whom it was assumed, and, lastly, it does not breach a particular 
statutory or legal rule.526 This approach introduces a new perspective in the context of voting 
agreements, passing from the complete denial of their validity to their admissibility, submitting 
them to an assessment of their compatibility with the public interest and the corporate 
functioning rules.527 
The validity of voting agreements was first recognized by the sentence of the Court of Cassation 
n. 9975 of 20 September 1995.528 The court held that the obligation arising from an agreement 
designed to determine in advance methods for appointing directors and auditors, operating 
outside the organizational structure, does not prevent shareholders to freely determine their will 
when voting in the meeting, nor deprives this body of the power of appointment.529 In this sense, 
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the commitment made by a shareholder to cast its vote differently from what established in the 
agreement does not affect the functioning of the company and the resolution taken by the 
meeting; it has relevance only for the eventual contractual liability towards the other parties of 
the agreement for the violation of the same.530 In the same way, the sentence of the Court of 
Cassation n.14865 of 23 November 2001 states the validity of voting agreements in the measure 
that they do not have an illegitimate influence on the functioning of the meeting, since they do 
not prevent shareholder to freely allocate its vote during the meeting.531  
Nevertheless, any doubt about the validity and enforceability of voting agreements, and more 
generally shareholders’ agreements, has been definitively dispelled by Italian legislator with 
articles 122 and 123 TUF before, and articles 2341-bis and 2341-ter after, has determined their 
validity and enforceability in all limited companies.532 However, the provisions introduced by 
these articles do not solve the traditional uncertainties regarding shareholders’ agreements. The 
discipline regulating such agreements can be viewed as incomplete since it is limited to regulate 
only the duration of the agreement for all limited companies and the disclosure process for 
public listed companies and companies that resort to the capital market.533 No mention is made 
for what concerns the way participants in a voting agreement should take decisions. Since 
shareholders’ agreements are grounded on the principle of private autonomy — enshrined in 
art. 1322 c.c. — the choice of how the majority should be formed lies in the contractual freedom 
of participants in the agreement, provided, of course, that it is compatible with the imperative 
norms set out by the legal system.534 Nonetheless, the method according to which the majority 
should be determined in a voting agreements does not have any effect with respect to the 
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purpose for which the agreement has been stipulated; in this sense, even a show of hands 
majority rule is able to pursue the aims of voting agreements by promoting personal relations, 
even if it has the effect of eliminating the rule stating the correlation between voting power and 
risk assumed. 
5.2 Blocking Agreements 
In practice, voting agreements are often complemented by blocking agreements acting, in this 
case, as integrative clauses that restrict the ability of contracting shareholders to sell, neither 
wholly nor partly, their shares or that include pre-emptive clauses to other participating 
shareholders.535 Blocking agreements, or more properly “sindacati di blocco”, are the 
counterparties of agreements establishing restrictions on the transfer of shares analyzed in the 
United States context. As for the latter, these agreements are contracts stipulated by 
shareholders who commit themselves to not alienate or limit the transfer of shares for a 
determined period of time.536 Blocking agreements is functional to the need of maintaining the 
stability and uniformity of corporate ownership structure, keeping unwanted investors from 
getting in.537  
As other shareholders’ agreements, they have a binding effect only among the contractual 
parties and have no relevance towards third parties and the company, to the point that a breach 
of the agreement has not incidence on the validity of the alienation of shares related to the 
agreement, but rather it determines the incurring of compensation for damage borne by 
breaching shareholder towards other parties to the agreement. 
However, blocking agreements do not only involve the ban on the alienation of companies’ 
shares, but other restrictions are also included. In fact, besides these agreements governing the 
inalienability of shares (patto di inalienabilità) the law recognizes other two types of 
transferring shares rights agreement, namely pre-emption agreement (patto di prelazione) and 
approval agreement (patto di gradimento).538 
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5.2.1 Drag-Along and Tag-Along Clauses 
As in the United States, in Italy shareholders’ agreements are likely to include tag-along and 
drag-along clauses in restricting the transferability of shares of participants in the agreement. 
Both rights involve the joint alienation of shares that can be justified by the purpose to obtain 
more favorable economic conditions from the transaction than those received from separate 
alienation or to maintain the relationship among participants in the agreement preventing the 
entry of outsiders. As we already mentioned before, the tag-along clause, also known as “piggy 
back”, allows minority shareholders to sell their shares at a percentage proportional to that in 
the sale of the majority shareholders at the same conditions offered to the latter. The clause that, 
according to the cases, can be substituted or may be provided for as an alternative to pre-
emption, just allows minority shareholders to obtain the same conditions offered to the majority 
shareholder in the sale of shares, who maintains the dominant position in the transaction, 
preventing minority shareholders to interfere in the transaction influencing the outcome.539 The 
application of the clause allows minority shareholders to obtain an increased value for the stake 
held, since the same conditions offered to the majority shareholder are applied for the minority 
stake as well, and also, it allows them to avoid a working relationship with an unwanted 
majority shareholder.540 
While the tag-along clause was thought to protect the interest of minority shareholders, the 
drag-along clause is designed to protect the majority shareholders. This clause confers to 
majority shareholders the right to negotiate not only the sale of its shares but also the 
participation of other shareholders who oblige themselves to sell them to the same buyer and at 
the same conditions. The application of the drag-along clause is more common in acquisitions 
regarding the entire participation share and where institutional investors are involved. In fact, 
the application of the drag-along right allows institutional investors, even if holding a minority 
stake, to liquidate at a control premium their investment by selling their shares to a third party, 
thus realizing their expected return on investment.541 The clause is particularly useful also for 
the majority shareholder since, giving the buyer the possibility to purchase the entire ownership 
stake, it may be willing to offer a higher price than what it would have offered to purchase only 
the majority of shares. 
 
539 Pedersoli A., Sindacati di Blocco: Validità, Tipi ed Effetti, in Bonelli F., Jaeger P. (1993). Sindacati di Voto e 
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540 De Matteis L. (2017). La clausola di trascinamento inserita nello statuto di una società a responsabilità limitata 
e criteri redazionali, Giur. Comm., No. 4, pp. 639-686. 
541 Id. at 640. 
98 
 
The application of the drag-along clause allows potential investors to purchase a greater portion 
of the company’s share capital and to obtain the control of the company, avoiding the rights 
granted to minority shareholders in terms of qualified majority requirements, veto rights upon 
meetings’ resolutions, and appointment rights of members in the board of directors.542 
The decision taken by the Court of Milan in 2018 has supported the corporate nature of this 
clause since it promotes the corporate structure’s homogeneity and the cohesion between the 
shareholders.543 Based on this guidance, it has been supported the opinion according to which 
the drag-along clause tends to protect the corporate interest and promote the homogeneity of 
the corporate structure by avoiding obstructive actions by the minority shareholders that 
otherwise would lead to an improper company’s functioning.544  
In this sense, the limited duration of shareholders’ agreements stated in the art. 2341-bis c.c. 
has made it necessary to give statutory relevance to the drag-along clause by advocating its real 
effectiveness — contrasted to the binding effect of shareholders’ agreements — particularly in 
the case of limited liability companies.545 The inclusion of the drag-along clause in the charter 
provides real effectiveness to the clause which may be enforced erga omnes, even against the 
transferee who is aware of the existence of the clause included in the corporate charter.546 The 
prevalent orientation requires the unanimity of shareholders for the inclusion of this clause in 
the charter of companies limited by shares.547 Although a part of doctrine argues that the 
quorum for the inclusion can be reached even by the majority, this orientation seems to be of 
difficult application, especially in limited liability companies that assume a marked 
personalistic nature.548 This principle is consistent with the jurisprudential orientation which 
has required the unanimity of shareholders for amendments of the corporate charter concerning 
a substantial modification of the shareholders’ rights and duties.549 
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The doctrine has taken opposite positions about the conditions that should trigger the 
application of drag-along clauses. While a part of it and the common practice sustain the 
activation of the clause with the intention of the majority shareholder to sell its entire ownership 
stake in the company,550 on the other hand, the other part argues that the clause should activate 
at the reception of a written offer from a third party concerning the purchase of the 100% of the 
share capital of the target company.551 The latter opinion can be supported by two arguments:552 
first, the conformation of the minority shareholder to the drag-along clause based only on the 
mere intention of the majority shareholder to sell the shares, prevent them to activate statutory 
mechanisms that should arise subsequently; and second, the condition to transfer the entire 
company’s capital has its fundament in the necessity to separate the conditions that activate tag-
along clauses, that often accompany drag-along clauses, so that the doubt related to which of 
the two clauses should trigger the sale of minority shareholders can be resolved.553 
The parties can decide to appoint a third independent party, an arbitrator, to determine the 
purchase price. Besides, dragged shareholders are granted the right to require the assessment of 
the price offered by a third party, whose timing of the procedure shall be coordinated so as to 
avoid that the period during the assessment is performed could jeopardize the success of the 
drag-along process.554 
5.2.2 Pre-Emption Agreements 
Pre-emption agreements included options similar to the rights of first offer and rights of first 
refusal discussed concerning the United States environment. They typically provide that, if a 
shareholder desires to sell its participation in the share capital, it is obliged to first offer that to 
other shareholders or the company itself at the same contractual conditions received by a third 
party; if other shareholders or the company do not redeem the pre-emption clause, the selling 
shareholder may sell its shares to outsiders. 
 
limited liability company with the aim to include the obligation for shares to make a deposit for the company or 
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Furthermore, the practice has shown that pre-emptive clauses may be articulated in different 
ways555: (a) simple pre-emption between contracting shareholders; (b) pre-emption that is first 
exercisable by one group of participants, and then by other participants or group of participants; 
(c) pre-emptive clauses providing that the majority of participants, once they become aware of 
a shareholder wanting to sell its shares, suggest a third person to whom the selling shareholders 
may contract with. The last pre-emptive clause is commonly applied in agreements known as 
approval agreements in which are reserved to majority shareholders the possibility to choose a 
potential investor willing to take over the ownership position left free by the selling shareholder. 
This clause — regulated by art. 2355-bis c.c. for limited companies — allows former 
shareholders to maintain the homogeneity of the corporate ownership structure, preventing the 
entry of individuals who can undermine this homogeneity because of their personal qualities 
that can be valued subjectively by the body in charge of that or objectively according to specific 
parameters established by the statutory clause.556 The failure to receive the approval entails the 
inefficiency of the transaction and the impossibility to introduce the buyer in the shareholders’ 
register.557 
 
5.2.3 Some Considerations about the Validity of Blocking Agreements 
Despite restrictions on the transfer of shares deriving from agreements concluded between 
shareholders in a corporation, on the one hand, have helped to stabilize the ownership structure 
of companies adopting them, on the other hand, they have been always discussed about their 
validity since no legislation upon such matter has existed. The essential characteristic of the 
share is its transferability, but nevertheless, this characteristic can be limited. Art. 2355-bis c.c. 
confirms the nature of free transferability of the share, and states that the corporate charter may 
contain provisions restricting the free transferability of shares and for a period no longer than 5 
years it can forbid the transfer.558 The restrictions can be included by amendment of the charter 
by a resolution taken by the majority of extraordinary meeting or can be contained in 
shareholders’ agreements. In the first case, the provisions have the effect of binding all the 
shareholders, leaving to the dissenting shareholder the possibility to withdraw from the 
company; whereas, in the second case the restrictions are applied only to shareholders who take 
part in the agreement and the possible breach of such restrictions does not compromise the 
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validity of the transfer, but it results in compensation for the damage caused by breaching 
shareholder. The article limits the application of restrictions in the cases of registered shares 
and failure to issue shares certificates.559 As regards other cases, no limits should be imposed 
on the transferability of shares; specifically, Borsa Italiana s.p.a. imposes the free 
transferability of shares of listed companies prohibiting any provision that limits their 
alienation. Instead, while the integration of such provisions in the charter of companies that 
resort to the capital market can be discussed, increasingly common is the adoption of 
shareholders’ agreements limiting the free transferability of shares. 
5.3 Controlling Agreements 
Article 2341-bis c.c., in defining the object that a shareholders’ agreement can assume, specifies 
that by the means of the agreement shareholders may be able to exercise a dominant influence 
on the management of the company. These agreements are acknowledged by the Italian 
legislative landscape with the name of sindacati di gestione. Their content is not conceived for 
the exercise of voting rights in the meeting as for voting agreements, but rather they encompass 
the administration of the corporation.560 Controlling agreements are concluded to specifically 
grant contracting shareholders, looking for certain stability, a dominance in conducting the 
business of the company or controlled companies. Parties to the agreement oblige themselves 
to agree on several administrative decisions and to ensure that the management body 
implements such decisions.561 Typical decisions concern appointments to corporate offices or 
offices of controlled companies, the company’s commercial strategy, investment plans, criteria 
for profit distribution.562 
As provided in art. 2341-bis (c), which specifically allows shareholders’ agreements to be 
stipulated with the purpose to exercise a dominant influence on the management, no doubts 
about the validity of these agreements should arise. Of the same opinion is the sentence of the 
Court of Milan of 2 July 2001 that recognizes, within the shareholders’ agreements category, 
agreements through which shareholders ensure that directors, appointed with their votes, 
comply with the administrative policies shareholders have decided for and replicate them in the 
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agreements are not totally absent in doctrine and jurisprudence. Particularly, scholars564 and 
courts565 supporting the invalidity of such agreements have deemed that they have the effect of 
removing from the hands of directors the exclusive power to manage the corporation laid down 
in article 2380-bis c.c. Although the principle of exclusivity of the management function in the 
hands of directors does not have a mandatory nature in the context of limited liability 
companies, where shareholders may reserve to themselves the authority to manage the business, 
it creates more concerns for companies in which the separation of powers between shareholders 
and directors is stressed. However, this orientation seems to ignore the fact that directors are 
always subject to the direction of shareholders without that their authority and responsibilities 
are violated.566  
 
Even if the legislator recognizes under art. 2341-bis (c) agreements that influence the actions 
of the management, this does not mean that they are always allowed, but instead, as courts have 
shown in practice, it is necessary to assess their validity and conformity with the fundamental 
corporate statutory rules on a case-by-case basis. These agreements are generally recognized 
also for listed companies with art. 122 TUF, which expressly allowed agreements having as 
object or effect, the exercise, even jointly, of a dominant influence on such companies for a 
period of time no longer than 3 years.567 As provided for the other shareholders’ agreements, 
they must be communicated to the CONSOB, otherwise, they should be void. In this sense, the 
two regimes that regulate shareholders’ agreements in listed companies and all other companies 
converge towards the common recognition of the validity of controlling agreements. 
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5.4 The Regulation in Listed and Close Companies: The Discipline of T.U.F. 
and Civil Code 
Given the different needs between public listed companies and not listed companies — 
including close companies and public companies that resort to the capital market — the 
legislator wanted to separate the legal framework regarding shareholders’ agreements for the 
two groups of corporations. 
As regards the type of shareholders’ agreements allowed by the law, the two legal frameworks 
converge at the same point providing for agreements: (a) having as the object the exercise of 
voting rights; (b) restrict or limit the transfer of shares; (c) having as the object or effect the 
exercise, even jointly, of a dominant influence on the company or companies that control them. 
Although art. 122 T.U.F. seems to include a wide range of agreements, namely those concerning 
obligations of preventive consultation for the exercise of voting rights and those providing for 
the purchase of shares or financial instruments, they can be implicitly found respectively in 
point a) and b) of article 2341-bis c.c.568 
Both two articles provide an exhaustive list of disclosure requirements that parties must comply 
with to properly communicate the presence of shareholders’ agreements so that they can be 
deemed valid. There is no doubt that these norms are more stringent under the provision of art. 
122 T.U.F., since the transparency of shareholders’ agreements is of fundamental importance 
for listed companies whose shares are traded in exchange markets. In these companies, where 
shares are freely traded, the communication of shareholders’ agreements affecting the 
ownership and control structure of the company empowers investors to make informed 
investment and disinvestment decisions. A deeper view of the disclosure requirements under 
T.U.F. and Civil Code will be provided in the following paragraph. 
Different is the duration of shareholders’ agreements laid down in two norms. Art. 122 T.U.F. 
stipulates a three-year term for shareholders’ agreements entered in public listed companies, 
whereas art. 2341-bis provides for a period of five years for agreements stipulated in not listed 
companies.569 They commonly state that in the case in which shareholders’ agreements have 
been concluded for a longer period than that established by the law, they are considered to be 
concluded for the legal term, unless parties decide to renew the agreement upon expiration. If 
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the agreement has been concluded for an indefinite period, each contracting party can withdraw 
from the contract with six months’ notice. 
5.5 Shareholders’ Agreements Disclosure  
As we already discussed, shareholders’ agreements often have the effect of altering the 
ownership structure and the management of the company with the aim of stabilizing the 
administration and corporate control. This situation requires the adoption of transparency rules 
that specially listed companies must comply with in order to prevent information asymmetries 
relating to the internal structure of the company that may comprise the proper functioning of 
the market.570 Provisions in terms of disclosure of shareholders’ agreements have been 
introduced by the Consolidated Law on Finance (T.U.F.), specifically for public listed 
companies with stringent norms regulating the transparency of such agreements, and then they 
were followed by disclosure requirements addressing close companies that resort capital in the 
market introduced by the company law reform of 2003.571 The separation of regulatory regimes 
can be explained by the different role that disclosure plays in the context of close and public 
companies: while in close companies it serves to outline the separating line between rules 
governing the company and those regulating shareholders’ agreements to preserve the interests 
of non-stipulating shareholders, in public companies the disclosure responds to market needs 
of communicating transparently the existence of agreements that may influence the corporate 
structure and control to empower investors to make informed investment and disinvestment 
decisions.572 Shareholders’ agreements transparency is ensured by communication 
requirements, whose non-compliance leads to sanctions. 
5.5.1 Disclosure Requirements for Listed Companies 
Article 122 T.U.F. regulates shareholders’ agreements disclosure for public listed companies. 
It specifies that are subject to disclosure obligation the agreement of any type having as 
object:573 (a) the exercise of voting rights in listed companies or in companies that control them; 
(b) the preventive consultation for the exercise of voting rights in these companies; (c) limits 
on the transfer of shares or financial instruments giving rights to their purchase or subscription; 
(d) the exercise, even jointly, of a dominant influence on these companies. These provisions do 
 
570 Filippelli M. (2019). La trasparenza dei patti parasociali nelle società per azioni, Rivista delle Società, Vol. 2, 
pp. 453-510. 
571 Id. at 463. 
572 Chionna V. V. (2008). La pubblicità dei patti parasociali, Giuffrè, Milano 2008, p. 45. 
573 Consolidated Law on Finance (TUF), art. 122 (1) and (5). 
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not apply to shareholders’ agreements comprising holdings less than the minimum threshold 
stated by art. 120 (2) T.U.F. (3% of share capital).574 The abovementioned agreements within 
5 days from their stipulation must be575: (a) communicated to CONSOB — the public authority 
responsible for regulating Italian financial markets; (b) published in excerpt in the daily press; 
(c) filed with the business register of the place where the company has its registered office; (d) 
communicated to the listed companies. Mandatory disclosure is also required for amendments, 
declarations of withdrawal, tacit renewal, or early termination.576 
The peremptory time limit of 5 days from the stipulation of the agreement affirms the interest 
to guarantee prompt and complete information on which investors base their informed 
investment decisions in a context not influenced by information asymmetries. In the case of 
oral agreements, the identification of the date when the 5-days term shall run is a bit more 
complicated. A major part of jurisprudence considers that the contract should be deemed to 
have been concluded when the agreement is perceived as legally binding by the parties, even if 
this standard is not easily applicable.577 
Any possible failure to comply with the disclosure requirements mentioned before shall 
determine the invalidity of the agreement and the right of vote attached to the listed shares, for 
which the disclosure has not been performed, is not exercisable.578 The legislator intended to 
protect the general interest related to the transparency of shareholders’ agreements by 
establishing their invalidity as a consequence of failure to disclose them, rather than providing 
for inefficacy.579 In the case of inefficacy, the disclosure of the agreement would be necessary 
only in the event of disagreement among the members. Instead by providing for not curable 
invalidity of the agreement, the legislator wanted to provide incentives for immediate 
disclosure.580 
In this sense, the doctrine has been expressed against the theory proposing the regularization of 
not disclosed shareholders’ agreements. Particularly, the legislator did not include in the 
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original provision the regularization of void agreements notwithstanding that this process is 
applicable in specific circumstances identified by the law. Additionally, by allowing that the 
agreement may be curable, this could incentivize shareholders to keep as secret as possible the 
agreement until contrasts between parties have emerged.581  
Art. 122 T.U.F. expressly prohibits the exercise of voting rights related to shares for which 
disclosure requirements of shareholders’ agreements concerning them have not been fulfilled. 
As result, shareholders’ meeting resolutions taken with the vote of no legitimate shareholders 
can be challenged even by the CONSOB.582 The length of the suspension of the right to vote is 
not determined by the legislator, however, the consensus recognizes it until the shareholders’ 
agreement complies with the requirements in terms of disclosure.583 The suspension has 
temporary nature and thus, is not referred to as an indefinite period. 
 
5.5.2 Disclosure Requirements under Art. 2341-ter c.c. 
The disclosure of shareholders’ agreements in companies that are not listed in an exchange 
market is regulated by art. 2341-ter c.c. The legislator with the company law reform of 2003 
wanted to introduce a distinction between public companies that resort in the capital market, 
and close companies that cannot issue financial instruments in the public.584 Art. 2341-ter 
applies only to companies that resort in the capital market, expressly excluding close companies 
from disclosure obligations. The legislator considered the issue of shareholders’ agreements 
disclosure related only to companies that trade securities in public markets, and thus, in close 
companies, where the corporate management is in the hands of a limited number of shareholders 
that control and limit the entry of new investors at their discretion, the presence of shareholders’ 
agreements does not undermine the stability of corporate powers.585 
The transparency of shareholders’ agreements having the effect of altering the ownership 
structure and the administration of the company is realized with different instruments with 
respect to those used for listed companies, and generally, the disclosure system for companies 
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that resort in the capital market is less burdensome and complex than that applied for listed 
companies.586 
Art. 2341-ter states that shareholders’ agreements in companies that resort in the capital 
market587: (a) shall be communicated to the company; (b) shall be declared before any 
shareholders’ meeting; (c) the statement shall be transcribed in the minute; (d) the latter shall 
be filed in the office of the business register. The communication of the agreement can be made 
by any shareholder participating in the same, regardless of its participation share in the capital, 
and it has a liberatory effect for other parties.588 Third parties become aware of the agreement 
since the filing of the minute containing the statement that declares the existence of a 
shareholders’ agreement in the business register.589 In the article, there is no indication stating 
if the communication should regard the entire content of the agreement or an indication of its 
essential elements, such as shareholders identity, number of shares included in the agreement, 
mutual duties, and so on. The doctrine seems to prefer the opinion supporting communication 
as close as possible to the real content of the shareholders’ agreement, thus, preventing any 
doubts on the privacy and matters regulated by the agreement.590  
The failure to disclose shareholders’ agreements at the opening of the meeting deprives parties 
of the agreement of the voting right and resolutions adopted with their vote may be challenged 
under what provided by art. 2377 c.c.591 These resolutions can be challenged by dissenting, 
abstained or, absent shareholders, directors, and members of the board of auditors.592 
The legal regime identified by art. 2341-ter is consistent with the rules concerning the invalidity 
of shareholders’ meeting resolutions. Even though the rigidity of the sanctions provided for the 
failure to disclose shareholders’ agreements as stated by the norm cannot be questioned, the 
legal system referred to art. 2341-ter appears less strict than that laid down by art. 122 T.U.F. 
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5.6 Enforcement of Shareholders’ Agreements: Invalidity and Breach   
As we have mentioned before, shareholders’ agreements’ validity has been recognized through 
the increasingly frequent and explicit legislative provisions regulating the field of these 
agreements. However, the legislative recognition has not prevented courts to ascertain, on a 
case by case basis, that such agreements did not infringe mandatory rules or was contrary to 
imperative principles, with a view to establish their validity.594  In this paragraph, we analyze 
the causes and cases of invalidity of shareholders’ agreements and then, the consequences to 
the breach of the agreement by shareholders. 
5.6.1 Invalidity of Shareholders’ Agreements 
The invalidity of shareholders’ agreements in the Italian legal framework is found in the 
incompatibility between purposes pursued by contracting shareholders and the social benefit.595 
As we have already seen, the contrast with binding provisions of the law shall determine the 
invalidity of the agreement. This is particularly the case of agreements including confidentiality 
clauses — so-called patti segreti — with the aim of concealing the corporate ownership 
structure. Any agreement including such clauses has to be deemed invalid because in contrast 
with one of the principles of the corporate reform of 2003 that requires the transparency of 
agreements entered by shareholders affecting the ownership structure and governance of the 
company.596  
Similarly, shareholders’ agreements binding the contracting parties to vote in contrast with the 
interests of the company should be declared invalid.597 This the opinion of the Court of 
Cassation with the sentence n.7030 of 27 July 1994, which held the invalidity of the agreement, 
which commits contracting shareholders not to vote the corporate liability action against the 
leaving shareholder and former director, on the ground that the content of this agreement is 
contrasted with imperative corporate rules and the interests of the company.598 In this particular 
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esercitare, ma neanche vincolarsi negozialmente ad esercitare il diritto di voto in contrasto con l'interesse della 
società, a nulla rilevando che il patto in questione riguardi tutti i soci della società, né che la compagine sociale 
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case, the court considered the application of the agreement as an infringement of the rules 
governing the formation of shareholders’ resolution of waiver of the directors’ corporate 
liability action, and at the same time contested the content of the agreement creating a conflict 
of interest with the company, preventing the latter to exercise claims resulting from the 
corporate liability action.599 Invalid are also agreements indirectly having external efficacy — 
towards third parties — of voting provisions, because of their contrast with the fundamental 
principle providing for an exclusive internal efficacy of shareholders’ agreements.600 
Furthermore, the jurisprudence considered void these agreements having as result the 
distribution of the entire company’s assets in the context of the liquidation process. The reason 
stands in the fact that shareholders, by proceeding to the voluntary distribution of the company’s 
assets among themselves, violate the rules laid down to guarantee creditors and the company 
itself protections during the liquidation process.601 Additionally, courts expressly prohibited 
agreements through which shareholders, directors, and liquidators intended to sell off 
company’s assets at a price far below their market value, in violation of the duty imposed by 
the law to fulfill their role of liquidators with the diligence of good housekeeping.602  
Moreover, shareholders’ agreements violating the prohibition of the so-called patto leonino603 
set out in art. 2265 c.c. have been declared void if they provide against the return of the initial 
capital contribution of receding shareholders without cause, and its equal allocation to 
shareholders parties of the agreement by way of compensation for damages.604 
To conclude, the assessment of shareholders’ agreements’ validity is based on the legitimacy 
of interests that shareholders intended to pursue by binding their conduct to what was provided 
for in the agreement. Thus, the purpose and content of these agreements must be decided for a 
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reasonable and worthwhile interest of the parties that must not be in contrast with the best 
interest of the company, and more in general with the public interest. 
5.6.2 Breach of Shareholders’ Agreements 
Doctrine and jurisprudence have quietly debated about what consequences must produce a 
breach of shareholders’ agreements. It has long been clear that shareholders’ agreements have 
an exclusively binding effect, which means that they only bind contracting shareholders and 
have no mandatory effect on the companies and other non-contracting shareholders, who 
remain external to agreements.605 Namely, shareholders’ agreement is not enforceable against 
the company and other shareholders who take no part in the agreement, in the application of the 
principle stating that the contract does not have an effect on third parties except in cases 
determined by the law.606 The binding effect implies that shareholders acting contrarily to what 
is determined in the agreement are exposed to the damages action brought by other parties.607 
Thus, jurisprudence providers for no remedies other than compensation for damages when a 
shareholder fails to comply with the provisions of the agreement.608 Given the binding effect of 
the agreement, parties are always free to exercise their rights as they see fit, aware of the fact 
that a possible exercise of the right in contrast to the provisions of the agreement results in a 
breach of it and, as consequence, other parties may require compensations for that breach. 
While shareholders’ agreements bind only stipulating parties and have effect only between 
them, on the other hand, statutory rules have real effectiveness, in the sense that all shareholders 
— current and future — are bound and, any corporate act approved with the vote of shareholders 
who committed themselves through an agreement to vote in a different way shall remain in 
force and not challengeable.609  
It has been debated whether compensation for damages was the most suited remedy for injured 
parties in a breach of shareholders’ agreement. If compensation for damages is able to 
effectively give full relief to injured parties, then it would constitute the desired remedy parties 
will be willing to receive. However, fair monetary estimations of damages for breach of the 
 
605 See Cassazione Civile, Sez. I, 21 November 2001, n. 14629. [providing that: “il patto cosiddetto parasociale 
con il quale alcuni soci concordino tra loro condizioni e modalità di sottoscrizione di un aumento del capitale 
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606 See Civil Code art. 1372, Italy 2003. 
607 See Giur. It., 2002, p. 562. [Court of Milan, 2 July 2001, expressly stated: “Il socio inadempiente a un sindacato 
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utile provocato dal suo inadempimento”]. 
608 Guaccero A., supra note 407, at 299. 
609 Giannini L., Vitali M., supra note 375, at 151. 
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agreement are often not easy to be determined by judges, and it is also true that under these 
conditions injured parties may prefer the enforcement by judges as consequences of the breach 
of the agreement.610 Nonetheless, the violation of a shareholders’ agreement does not produce 
the invalidity of the resolution taken by the vote cast by breaching shareholders, hence a forced 
execution would not be admissible. The Court of Rome supported this opinion with the sentence 
of 20 December 1996, in which pronounced the inadmissibility of enforcement ordered by the 
judge to vote in accordance with the agreement as an offense against the right to freely 
determine itself in the meeting.611 
In support of the real effectiveness of shareholders’ agreements is the decision taken by the 
Court of Genoa of 8 July 2004, which has expressly admitted the application of art. 700 c.p.c. 
providing for an emergency measure of the specific remedy of a shareholder performance in a 
shareholders’ agreement.612 The court recognizes the admissibility of an emergency measure 
which provides for specific remedy in cases where, before the meeting, shareholders parties to 
the voting agreement realize that one or more participating shareholders do not intend to comply 
with the decision passed by a majority of the participants in the agreement.613 In this case, by 
voiding the registration of the transfer of shares in the shareholders’ register in breach of an 
agreement limiting the transfer of them and pre-emptive clauses, the court recognized that the 
effectiveness of shareholders’ agreement is not limited to the relationship between contracting 
shareholders, but it extends to the company.614  
Finally, since jurisprudence did not give an unequivocal opinion on the matter, in a first attempt 
injured parties may request the enforcement of specific performance by the judge in order to 
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respect the content of the agreement, and then, if it is refused, they may demand compensation 
for damage.615 
5.7 Chapter Conclusions  
As made for the United States context, this chapter intended to investigate the regulation of 
shareholders’ agreements according to the Italian legal framework. The first regulation of 
shareholders’ agreements was introduced with the Consolidated Law on Finance of 1998 
limited to public listed companies. It governs the content and disclosure requirements Italian 
listed companies must comply with if their shareholders regulate their relationship by the means 
of an agreement. Shareholders’ agreements were recognized also for not listed companies with 
the reform of the Civil Code of 2003 with provisions similar to those already designed for listed 
companies. Both art. 122 T.U.F. and 2341-bis c.c. identify three types of object shareholders’ 
agreements may assume, which concern: a) the exercise of voting rights; b) the limitation on 
the transfer of shares; c) the exercise of a dominant influence on the company. 
The first type of agreements — voting agreements — concerning the right to vote in the meeting 
has experienced a turbulent evolution in the Italian legal landscape. Firstly, they were deemed 
illegal on the ground that their admissibility would have determined the division between the 
voting right and the ownership of the shares, along with the effect that they would cause in 
altering the proper functioning of the meeting which promotes the determination of 
shareholders’ will inside and during the meeting. Moreover, even shareholders’ agreements 
deliberating to the majority were viewed negatively from the doctrine since they have the effect 
of circumventing the majority rule by allowing minority shareholders to combine their 
ownership stake to control the company. Only in recent years, the validity of votings agreements 
was recognized first by jurisprudence and then, with art. 122 and 123 T.U.F. and art. 2341-bis 
and 2341-ter c.c. 
As we already saw, blocking agreements include restrictions on the transfer of shares of 
shareholders participating in the agreement to maintain the stability of the ownership structure 
of the company. Agreements may restrict the ability of shareholders to transfer the shares by 
simply forbidding or limiting the alienation of shares, or they may provide for pre-emptive 
clauses or drag-along/tag-along rights which grant remaining shareholders particular rights. Of 
particular relevance, drag-along clauses allow minority shareholders to obtain the same 
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conditions offered to the majority shareholder by a third party. The clause permits minority 
shareholders to realize a control premium in the sale of their shares that otherwise would have 
been difficult to obtain. The jurisprudence in a recent decision affirmed the nature of the drag-
along clause as a tool to promote the homogeneity and cohesion between shareholders. 
Third, controlling agreements involve the exercise of a dominant influence on the company. 
They ensure certain stability in the corporate structure allowing shareholders who entered into 
the agreement to determine the actions to be taken in the administration of the company. 
Although they may be seen as an attempt to remove the management power from the hands of 
directors, art. 2341-bis (2) expressly provides for their validity. 
Our analysis continues with the comparison of the provisions contained in art. 122 T.U.F. and 
art. 2341-bis respectively for listed companies and not listed companies. After having discussed 
the differences between the two legal regimes, we provide an overview of the disclosure 
requirements under art. 122 T.U.F. and art. 2341-ter c.c. Certainly, strict rules are established 
by art. 122 T.U.F. for listed companies since the higher need for transparency that is required 
by active investors on the market who want to be aware of the existence of agreements having 
the effect of altering the ownership structure of the company to enable them to make informed 
investment or disinvestment decisions. Instead, art. 2341-ter is applied only to companies who 
resort to the capital market since the disclosure responds to the need of insiders rather than of 
outside potential investors. On the other hand, close companies are not required to disclose the 
existence of shareholders’ agreements. 
Lastly, the chapter concludes with the description of the causes that determine the invalidity of 
shareholders’ agreements and the consequences of a breach of them. Besides the invalidity 
declared for the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements established under art. 122 
T.U.F. and art. 2341-ter c.c., are deemed invalid such agreements that contrast with the social 
benefit. This means, that all the agreements whose content is incompatible with the interest of 
the company must be considered invalid. The violation of what is established in the agreement 
by a contracting shareholder does not have the effect of voiding the resolution taken by the vote 
of this shareholder in the general meeting. This means that shareholders’ agreements have a 
binding effect only among the parties to the agreement and they do not affect the outcome of 
the resolution even if the shareholder decided to cast its vote differently from what was 
established in the agreement. Hence, injured shareholders cannot require the enforcement of the 
judge for the breach of a shareholders’ agreement, but rather the only reasonable remedy is 
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represented by the compensation for damages. This remarks the binding effect shareholders’ 
agreements produce only within shareholders who take part in the agreement, contrary to 
statutory rules included in the articles of association or bylaw which have the effect of binding 


































The recognition of the validity or invalidity of shareholders’ agreements by the case law, 
especially in the United States, has actually triggered the efforts of lawmakers to draft statutes 
aimed at meeting the special need of close corporations. Until that moment, closely-held 
companies were subject to the traditional corporate law, whose rules were drafted having the 
needs of public corporations in mind. Furthermore, courts often applied partnership rules to 
resolve close corporations’ issues following the concept that the particular features of close 
companies have resembled those of partnerships in a certain way. However, the rules have 
proved to be largely inadequate for close corporations because of their restricted flexibility and 
costly measures shareholders in this type of corporate organization have to adopt. For this 
reason, states started to enact close corporations statute including provisions specifically suited 
for those companies characterized by a limited number of shareholders who often participate 
actively in the management of the corporation and whose shares cannot be sold in a public 
securities market and are typically subject to restrictions on their transferability. Differently, in 
Europe, the close corporation legislation derived from the close corporation statutes that every 
State enacted, rather than through the case law as in the case of the United States. Here, there 
have been attempts to regulate the close corporation at the Community level by establishing a 
common form of close companies that SMEs may use to easily conduct business within the EU. 
Even if results were not those expected, these efforts showed the growing importance that 
specific rules addressed to close corporations only have for the EU legislator. 
The close company’s features discussed in the work are likely to create agency problems 
between the majority shareholder and minority shareholders who are exposed to the 
opportunistic behavior of the former. The information asymmetries arising from the agency 
relationship in both close and public companies are reduced by the mechanisms of corporate 
governance which tend to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. In fact, 
corporate governance consists of a system of principles and rules that provides the guidelines 
for an efficient internal organization of the company, so as to reduce and manage conflicting 
interests arising between insiders and all stakeholders. Especially in the case of public 
companies, corporate governance systems were structured differently depending on the country 
of reference and on the ownership structure of companies in those countries. The outsider 
system, typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries is characterized by the presence of dispersed 
ownership in public companies, great presence of institutional investors, separation of control 
between shareholders and managers. In this system, the agency relationship that is likely to 
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arise is that between shareholders and directors who hold the exclusive power to manage the 
company. Thus, the corporate governance mechanisms are aimed at reducing the information 
asymmetries between the two constituencies and aligning the interests of the managers with 
those of the shareholders. On the contrary, the focus of the insider system, diffused in the 
Continental European countries, is the protection of minority shareholders since even the 
ownership structure of public companies is characterized by a great presence of a majority 
group and less presence of institutional investors. Hence, among this structure, corporate 
governance mechanisms are adopted to reduce the agency problems that the majority 
shareholder is likely to cause through an opportunistic behavior against minority shareholders. 
Given the differences described in the two abovementioned systems, we can identify the 
common part and in what differ the corporate governance frameworks of the two countries — 
Italy and the United States — under this study. While in the United States the Board of Directors 
is structured according to the one-tier-rule, with one board vested with the power to manage the 
company and internally supervise the actions of directors; in Italy, shareholders are likely to 
adopt a two-tier board, where the role of supervising the directors’ actions and ensuring the 
proper organizational, administrative, and accounting structure of the company is vested in the 
hands of a Supervisory Board. Moreover, given the presence of a majority controlling 
shareholder in the Italian listed companies, the law gives minority shareholders some 
protections. In fact, it provides for the mandatory representation of minority shareholders in the 
BoDs for Italian listed companies. The same provision does not apply for U.S. listed companies 
since their ownership structure is widely held among a large number of shareholders and mainly 
institutional investors. In both countries, a mandatory audit of the annual financial statements 
and accounting books of listed companies must be performed by an external audit firm. In Italy, 
close companies are not required to have their financial statements audited, unless they draft 
consolidated financial statements, or when exceed for two consecutive years the threshold 
established by the law. Also, in the United States, although private companies do not have the 
obligation to have the financial statements audited, they may undergo an external audit for 
financial market reasons. 
Moreover, public and close companies may dispose of internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms to better solve the agency problems and align the interests of the 
parties. Undoubtedly, internal corporate governance mechanisms such as size, composition, and 
diversity of the board, and independence of the audit committee, are more appropriate to 
improve the corporate governance of public companies. On the contrary, in close companies, 
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shareholders shall take measures more suitable for their needs to custom the relationship among 
themselves and towards the company. Instead of modeling the relationships and the control of 
the company through the amendment of the charter or bylaws, shareholders are more likely to 
stipulate shareholders’ agreements that empower them to waive some rights that otherwise 
cannot be removed by the charter and bylaws. Shareholders’ agreements are written or oral 
contracts between shareholders in a company through which they can decide how to dispose of 
the voting rights or to maintain a continuum and stability in the ownership structure. Generally, 
shareholders enter into these for a variety of reasons including a) the concentration of control 
of the company by pooling their votes; b) to ensure the stability of the ownership structure 
restricting the opportunity to enter or leave the company; c) to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders guaranteeing them to express their expectations and intentions during the meeting; 
d) to avoid deadlock situations, and so forth. Thus, the content of shareholders’ agreements 
typically involves the exercise of voting rights in the company meeting or the limits on the 
transfer of shares. Shareholders’ agreements can be concluded with parties other than 
shareholders only under the condition that one party must be a shareholder of the company. 
Hence, the company itself or the management can be a party to the shareholders’ agreement. In 
the specific case in which, the content of the agreement concerns the functioning of the 
company or the relationship between shareholders, even an outsider may enter into such an 
agreement with shareholders. 
It is clear from this work that shareholders’ agreements respond perfectly to the needs of 
shareholders in close corporations. In a situation, characterized by the presence of few 
shareholders who also take a management position and hold shares subject to restrictions on 
their transfer, the shareholders’ agreement is a powerful tool to ensure the protection of the 
contracting parties. As result, it is not surprising that shareholders’ agreements are widely 
diffused in the context of close companies. On the other hand, the traditional corporate rules of 
the separation between ownership and control and the periodic election of directors ensure 
shareholders in public listed companies with a fair degree of protection. Moreover, the 
application of restriction on the transfer of shares would go against the free transferability of 
shares that constitutes an essential protection instrument for the needs of public investors. 
Empirical evidence has shown the limited use of shareholders’ agreements in public companies, 
along with the tendency of shareholders to terminate agreements between themselves as the 
company going public. This phenomenon is marked in frameworks like the United States, 
where the ownership structure is widely dispersed. This pattern of ownership structure prevents 
shareholders to enter into shareholders’ agreements to concentrate the power to control the 
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company. In addition, institutional investors, who hold a large part of the share capital of U.S. 
listed companies, have no incentive to specifically restrict the transfer of their shares since from 
their alienation they realize the return on their investment. Shareholders’ agreements in public 
listed companies are more common where the ownership of the company is more concentrated, 
as it is in Italy. Here, despite shareholders’ agreements are experiencing a decreasing trend, 
they are used more to regulate shareholders’ behavior rather than to concentrate voting power. 
In the last part of the work, we provide an analysis of shareholders’ agreements’ regulation in 
the United States and Italy. We intend to analyze the legal treatment of these agreements in the 
two countries chosen as the reference of, respectively, common and civil law. It is desirable to 
conclude the analysis by discussing the similar points and the different features of the two legal 
systems in regulating shareholders’ agreements.  
We have already acknowledged as shareholders’ agreements in the U.S. are not subject to a 
single regulation as it occurs in Italy, but rather each State provides its own corporation code 
with slightly different provisions governing shareholders’ agreements. Apart from this notice, 
the starting point in this comparative analysis seems to be represented by the corporate form to 
which early legal recognition is addressed. Before the revision of 2016, the MBCA provisions 
were exclusively directed to close companies, with the condition that, from the moment the 
shares are listed in a stock exchange, the agreement authorized by section 7.32 MBCA ceases 
to be effective. Conversely, in Italy, shareholders’ agreements experienced the first legal 
recognition in the context of public listed companies with the Consolidated Law on Finance. 
The introduction of provisions aimed at regulating shareholders’ agreements in listed 
companies responds to the need of the Italian legislator to guarantee the transparency of the 
ownership structure of the company for the proper functioning of markets. Only later with the 
corporate reform of 2003, the legislator introduced provisions for shareholders’ agreements 
concluded in limited liability companies and companies that resort to the capital market. 
Both Italian and U.S. legislators allow shareholders to conclude agreements having as object 
the exercise of voting rights in the shareholders’ meeting and/or restrictions on the transfer of 
shares. However, in addition to these two objectives, art. 2341-bis of the Italian Civil Code 
expressly allows shareholders to enter into an agreement to exercise a dominant influence on 
the company, controlled or controlling company. Differently from the Italian regulation, the 
U.S. law system contains provisions specifically drafted for three types of agreements that fall 
within the voting agreements, namely voting trusts, proxy agreements, and pooling agreements. 
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Moreover, while the Italian legislator wanted to separate the regulation of shareholders’ 
agreements in listed and close companies by providing for a different duration and disclosure 
regimes, no distinction was made in the U.S. legal framework among shareholders’ agreements 
concluded in public and close companies. As regards the duration of shareholders’ agreements 
the U.S. legislator in the revision of the MBCA of 2016 removed the 10 year-term of the 
agreements, thus empowering shareholders to determine the duration of the shareholders’ 
agreement which must be indicated within the same agreement. Conversely, in Italy, 
shareholders’ agreements have a duration no longer than 3 years for listed companies and 5 
years for limited liability companies and companies that resort to the capital market. 
In the United States, shareholders’ agreements’ disclosure rules are not so detailed as the Italian 
legislator wanted to provide. As we got to explain before, this can be justified by the limited 
diffusion that shareholders’ agreements have in U.S. listed companies. Little provisions can be 
found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which establishes the obligation to disclose 
participation of more than 5% of the company’s equity shares. Shareholders in listed 
companies, however, are obliged to disclose the existence of shareholders’ agreements by 
communicating them to the SEC. On the other hand, the Italian legislator built a complete and 
complex disclosure regime to which listed companies and companies that resort to the capital 
market are subject. Of course, according to the different role played by the disclosure in the two 
types of companies, the rules established by art. 122 T.U.F. for listed companies are stricter 
than those set out by art. 2341-ter for companies that resort to the capital market. Art. 122 T.U.F. 
requires that shareholders’ agreements comprising more than 3% of the share capital, within 5 
days from the stipulation, must be communicated to the authority responsible to regulate the 
Italian financial market (CONSOB), published in excerpt in the daily press, filed with the 
business register of the place where the company has its registered office and communicated to 
the company. Instead, shareholders’ agreements which fall under the provisions of art. 2341-
bis and 2341-ter must be simply communicated to the company, declared before any meeting, 
and filed within the minute in the office of the business register. In both cases, the failure to 
comply with the disclosure requirements determines the unavailability of voting rights and the 
challenge of the resolution adopted by these defective votes. 
In both jurisdictions, shareholders’ agreements have been seen with mistrust by the 
jurisprudence who often declared their invalidity, as contrasted with fundamental corporate 
rules. Particularly, voting agreements were challenged on the opinion that their application 
would violate the inseparability of shares with the voting rights attached to them and jeopardize 
120 
 
the proper functioning of the meeting allowing shareholders to determine their will outside the 
place where it must be defined. However, today, these opinions have been overcome and the 
general approach recognizes the validity of shareholders’ agreements. The U.S. doctrine and 
jurisprudence generally rule the validity of shareholders’ agreements unless they negatively 
affect other shareholders, creditors, and third parties. The law requires that, for their 
enforcement, shareholders’ agreements must be unanimous and set in the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws. In this sense, the necessary condition required by the U.S. legislator 
for their enforceability is the knowledge of shareholders of the existence of shareholders’ 
agreements. On the other hand, the Italian legal framework provides for the invalidity of 
shareholders’ agreements when they contrast the binding provisions established by the 
corporate law. In this sense, courts rule the validity of shareholders’ agreements if they are 
concluded for the best interest of the company and they do not infringe the public interest. 
Different are the remedies for the breach of shareholders’ agreements adopted by the U.S. and 
Italian jurisprudence. In the United States, courts typically order a specific performance for the 
breach of shareholders’ agreements. Injunctive relieves are also granted upon the occurrence of 
specific circumstances. Conversely, for the Italian jurisprudence, the only remedy available for 
a breach of shareholders’ agreements is constituted by the compensation for damages. This 
position was taken by considering the binding effect that these agreements have only among 
contracting parties, and thus, any shareholder who wants to vote in violation of the agreement 
is liable only towards other injured parties with no effect on the resolution taken by this vote. 
Although there have been cases in which courts ruled for specific remedies in emergency 
situations, the common attitude defines the compensation for damages as the legal remedy for 
breach of shareholders’ agreements.  
This work still opens up different opportunities for future research. The unsolicited request for 
the disclosure of shareholders’ agreements in closely-held companies does not provide room 
for conducting empirical research on the agreements concluded in these companies. For this 
reason, future research could focus on shareholders’ agreements of U.S. and Italian public listed 
companies, analyzing different aspects, including how the ownership structure of the company 
is influenced by the conclusion of a shareholders’ agreement, the relationship between firm 
performance and shareholders’ agreements, the effects of the disclosure on the sentiment of 
markets, the role of pyramidal structures and multiple voting shares for the private ordering of 
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